

The Exit Strategy Myth and the End State Reality

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Preface

The concepts of end state and exit strategy have many facets, but they share one clear characteristic: the need for further development and refinement. Future research on end state planning and application in places like the Balkans, East Timor, and South America will highlight even more strengths and weaknesses than I can address.

I am indebted first and foremost to my two faculty mentors at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Dr. Evelyn Farkas and Lt. Col. Stephen Kaczmar. Both left the CSC faculty for bigger and better things just after I graduated, and my respect for them is exceeded only by my sympathy for future students who will not benefit from their wisdom. I am also grateful to my two faculty advisors, Dr. Donald F. Bittner and Lt. Col. John R. Atkins, whose instruction throughout the year influences all my thinking about political-military issues. Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Gideon Rose of the Council of Foreign Relations, who provided me copies of unpublished papers from a 1996 CFR study group on exit strategy that helped direct my research

and inform my conclusions. Of course, any errors in this paper are strictly the responsibility of the author.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The Exit Strategy Myth and the End State Reality

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Thesis: The design and application of military end states, rather than exit strategies, can improve end states designed for national strategy and diplomatic actions.

Discussion: While the term "exit strategy" has become synonymous with questions about U.S. military deployments, U.S. officials have failed to apply the more important concept of "end state" as successfully as possible. Military end states, as necessary elements of military planning and conduct, can help refine strategic and diplomatic end states that sometimes become clouded by changes in circumstance.

Four recent U.S. military interventions provide useful lessons about the importance of end states. The 1982-84 Lebanon case and 1992-94 Somalia case demonstrate the difficulties of missions where initial objectives are met by subsequent end states, such as they may exist, reach too far. The 1990-91 Iraq case and the 1994-96 Haiti case demonstrate how careful end state planning by the military can refine strategic goals and steady diplomatic end states.

Conclusions: In all four cases, the question of transition planning appears central to the end state process, both for ending the military operation as successfully and as soon as possible as well as for the achievement of diplomatic and strategic objectives.

Transition planning and clear military statements of end state will ensure unity of effort and foster success in military operations.

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One of the most critical challenges for a United States decision to use force today is also one of the simplest: when do you stop? For most of the 20th century, U.S. policy on military intervention was guided by the traditional focus on "wars of annihilation," with total commitment resulting in total victory.¹ After World War Two, the commitment to containment by meeting and blocking Soviet expansion led to a more complex, coordinated use of political, economic and military elements of national power to accomplish strategic objectives. The two most significant exceptions to this strategy, Korea and Vietnam, proved that the limitations of containment could support U.S. national interests effectively.

In the 1990s, the U.S. was confronted for the first time with the concept of playing a leading role in the world while not having a clear competitor for that role. The "sole superpower" had no specific enemy or competing state that could yield guidance for limiting U.S. intervention abroad.² The U.S. thus found itself somewhat uncertain about when and how to intervene, especially in cases where the use of

¹ Russell F. Weigley, The American Way Of War (Bloomington, In; Indiana University Press, 1973), xx-xxii.

² Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 22.

military force seemed a far easier way to "restore stability" or "respond to a crisis" than diplomatic or economic policy instruments.³ U.S. policy makers, especially military leaders, were simultaneously concerned about limiting the use of military force to preclude longer-term deployments in an era of limited war and "military operations other than war."⁴

In the 1990's, "exit strategy" became the most popular term for discussion of these matters.⁵ U.S. political and military leaders, reflecting broader U.S. public opinion, saw no problem in designing military operations by minimizing their duration and size. The military's traditional concepts of mission objectives and "end states" received little attention in an environment where the questions of how and when U.S. forces would leave became more important than how they would achieve a strategic goal. U.S. leaders, members of Congress, and the media seemed to think the U.S., as the sole world superpower with broad and somewhat uncertain interests, could afford to conduct military operations with

³ For the purposes of this paper, "policy" refers to national strategy actions that include military, diplomatic, and other instruments of national power. The term "diplomatic" refers to foreign policy and other actions traditionally grouped under the "diplomatic" element of national power, as opposed to the military, economic, or information element.

⁴ This paper seeks to address common characteristics of termination for all military operations, whether or not they are "other than war."

⁵ The issue is summarized in Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion", "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 77, No. 1 (January-February 1998).

only unspecified policy interests and goals as guideposts. U.S. leaders would later learn that failing to connect policy and military operations could lead to a disaster in Somalia, a success in Haiti, and endless debates about Iraq, the Balkans, and Africa.

This paper will seek to clarify such debates by re-examining the connection between policy objectives and military operations in terms of the "end state" concept. Such a discussion requires a more specific look at the concepts of "end state" and "exit strategy." A brief analysis of the application of the "end state" concept over the last 50 years follows, with more detailed attention on two examples of end state success (Iraq in 1990-91, Haiti in 1995) and failure (Lebanon in 1982-3, Somalia in 1993). Each case summary will focus on the respective diplomatic and military end states and how they related to the overarching strategic policy objective.

The paper will conclude with more general analysis as to how military end states can improve diplomatic end states, smoothing the transition to policy actions with a priority on diplomacy. The case studies will show that military end states, while not solving all problems caused by weak policy or changing circumstances, can clarify policy weaknesses and uncertainties regarding the use of military force.

The Concepts of End States and Exit Strategies

Part of the problem in defining and applying the "end state" concept today stems from the numerous definitions and concepts involved in war and politics, especially in terms of war termination.⁶ Most political and military leaders accept Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is an extension of politics by other means,"⁷ but is politics an extension of war? More specifically, are conflicts of interests among states best measured by standards of war or standards of policy? In today's world, policy discussions generally serve as the means to define and redefine such interests.

Political leaders define interests in terms of policy, and modern military leaders expect a sufficiently clear statement of such interests from their political leadership before designing military strategies.

War can thus be defined as organized violence by states to obtain political ends, especially those ends deemed vital to national interests and unreachable by non-violent means. Clausewitz, while recognizing the necessity of war at times

⁶ Translations of Carl von Clausewitz's work use the terms "politics" and "policy" somewhat interchangeably. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the more relevant "policy" use of the term.

⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

in international relations, advocates ending wars as quickly as possible for both military and political reasons.⁸ Wars end when governments obtain the best possible settlement in accordance with national interests. While Clausewitz and other historical commentators emphasize the importance of working towards and achieving victory, they also see military power as a coercive political device regardless of whether military forces actually enter combat.

More modern commentators on war termination emphasize the broader nature of policy over and above military aspects of war. These arguments do not ignore Clausewitz's concept of war's intimate relationship to policy, but they incorporate more contemporary thinking about political restrictions, advantages, and other factors affecting the decision to go to war. In other words, while Clausewitz's thoughts on such concepts as "centers of gravity" and "culminating points" remains extremely relevant, more political aspects of his work are somewhat outdated in an era of increasing democracy, free trade, and other non-hostile instruments of national power. Clausewitz's concept of conquering territory in order to improve one's position in postwar negotiations, for example, seems less relevant in a

⁸ Most of On War indicates Clausewitz considers combat, and especially decisive action, to have a shorter duration than peace or other situations short of actual hostilities. See especially On War, 80-82.

world where economic and political power provides even greater and more secure advantages.⁹

Traditional U.S. foreign policy clarifies this difference in its competing worldviews of Wilsonian idealism and realpolitik views of international relations. As Henry Kissinger has noted, the U.S. has emphasized one of these trends over the other in different eras of its foreign policy, even as it sought a rhetorical balance between them.¹⁰ Jane Lute provides a useful means to resolve this argument in her suggestion that stable, predictable foreign relations should serve as one U.S. long-term policy need, in contrast to more malleable policy interests.¹¹

All of these terms and trends -- war and politics, idealism and realpolitik, policy interests and policy needs -- affect the terms "end state" and "exit strategy" as applied in the implementation of national strategy, foreign policy and military plans. Strategic "end state" describes a state of affairs to be achieved through the deployment of all elements of national power in pursuit of national interests. Strategic end states support both broad principles and

⁹ Clausewitz, 82.

¹⁰ Kissinger, 23.

¹¹ Jane Lute speech on November 29, 2000, to the "National Security in the 21st Century", Center for Naval Analysis conference, Washington, D.C.

specific U.S. policies designed to apply those principles. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, for example, supported the strategic principles of "deterring aggression," ensuring access to foreign markets and energy," and "preventing the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons."¹² President Bush specified these principles on August 8, 1990, in two more specific strategic policy end states: "first, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored...."¹³

Whatever the action, strategic policy end states guide the use of the four elements of national power: military, diplomatic, economic, and information. Strategic end states rarely include more specific measures to achieve such goals, leaving design and application of those measures to the more specific actions of the four elements of national power.

Diplomatic end states share the same conceptual characteristics as strategic end states, but with more specific goals and measures to achieve them. The Department of State and other U.S. foreign policy institutions today

¹² George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States: 1991-1992 (McLean, VA: Brassey's, US (Inc.), 1991, 11-13.

¹³ George Bush, speech to the nation, August 8, 1990; reprinted in John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), 12.

increasingly publicize end states to measure success or failure, but political terms still define those end states and make them easier to adjust than concrete military actions.¹⁴

In the case of Desert Storm, for example, the U.S. placed an early priority on obtaining a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of "any means necessary" to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 marked achievement of this concrete goal.¹⁵ In most cases involving the use of force, however, diplomatic end states can become more problematic than strategic end states because government leaders find diplomatic tactics and end states easier to change than military tactics and end states. The intense debate about whether Saddam Hussein's removal was a specific goal of Iraq diplomatic policy and of Desert Storm is only one example of this problem.

In contrast, military leaders usually draw on clearer achievements and measures to plan and achieve an end state. Military end states are flexible, but they require clearer measures than policy or diplomatic end states even after

¹⁴ For examples, see the U.S. Department of State's "Strategic Plan for 2001," 1-5.

¹⁵ Fishel, 13.

adjustment. U.S. joint military doctrine defines end state as follows:

What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude -- both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power.¹⁶

U.S. Army doctrine focuses primarily on the military aspects of end state:

"Military end state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state."¹⁷

Regarding military operations other than war, such as peace enforcement or humanitarian relief, the Army focuses even more on separation between military and political aspects:

In operations other than war, the end state is commonly expressed in political terms and is beyond the competence of military forces acting alone. Military forces in operations other than war facilitate the political process.¹⁸

Joint publications did not include definitions of "exit strategy" until recently, though the term occasionally appears in some sources.¹⁹ This comes as no surprise, since

¹⁶ Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Pub 1-02), 23 March 1994 (as amended 14 June 2000), 174.

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Operations (FM 100-5).

¹⁸ "Operations Other Than War, Peace Operations," Volume IV, No. 93-8, December 1993, Center for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth Kansas.

¹⁹ Joint Pub 1-02, DOD's basic dictionary, does not include or define the term. Its most recent appearance in Joint Pub 3-57 (8 February 2001),

exit strategy in business means (1) withdrawal from a market that was not conducive to the business in question and (2) planning for disengagement in a way that forestalls future engagement in similar circumstances. Both implications run against the "American Way of War" that fosters images of U.S. actions always destined to succeed and, since World War Two, continuous engagement to protect and promote U.S. interests as a global power.

In sum, national strategy and diplomatic policies rarely reach full end states, even if the military element of a foreign policy does. In a major war, all three end states are clear: victory over an enemy on acceptable terms. In a less serious contingency, national strategy may aim simply at reducing tensions to the point that major U.S. interests are no longer threatened. The question confronting policy-makers and others today relates to how the three end states relate to one another. A review of recent history demonstrates that a military end state, with demonstrable, concrete objectives to reach en route, can help to refine and guide national strategy and diplomatic end states during military operations.

although without a definition, comes as no surprise: the subject of the publication is "Civil-Military Relations."

Containment

During the Cold War, the development of the U.S. policy of containment provided a well-defined guideline for developing end states. Foreign policy measures integrated military, diplomatic, economic and information activities by two standards: (1) their contribution to containing the expansion of Soviet influence, and (2) their contribution to stability in the non-Communist world.²⁰ The former guided decisions to escalate the use of instruments of national power; the latter provided a unified yardstick to measure the success of policy instruments. These standards presented some difficulties for a people and government who saw the unprecedented political alliances, military build-up, and "unconditional surrender" of World War Two as the ideal examples of U.S. foreign policy against hostile powers -- in Russell Weigley's terms, a decisive "war of annihilation" in which the (U.S.) forces of good would win.²¹ U.S. political and military leaders nonetheless successfully used those standards to design and implement successful policies throughout the Cold War.

²⁰ Put another way, NSC-68 provided the strategic policy of containment, whereas George Kennan's original concept set the limit on not attacking the Soviet Union directly.

²¹ Weigley, xxii.

The end state concept also provides insights into the two exceptions that proved these standards: Korea and Vietnam. Military intervention in Korea seemed a clear success following the successful landing at Inchon because U.S. and Allied forces had a fairly clear end state of restoring the status quo ante, i.e. the 38th parallel as a temporary dividing line between North and South Korea. The subsequent failure of military intervention due to Chinese entry into the war demonstrated the importance of understanding the limits inherent in an end state strategy. Discussions in December 1950 focused first on the limits facing the U.S. effort.²² The diplomatic costs and military risks of expanding the war into mainland China eventually won out over some military suggestions to attempt a decisive battle there.

Most commentators see the decision to limit the war as both a good decision to avoid war with the Soviet Union and as a precursor to classic U.S. containment strategy using all elements of national power.²³ Fighting continued for more than two years because U.S. officials were unable to convince

²² A U.S.-U.K. summit in early December provided some interesting examples of the important roles allies can have in influencing these discussions. See Rosemary Foote, "British Influence on the American Decision to Expand the Korean War," *Journal of Military History*, April 1986, 45.

²³ William Stueck, The Korean War, 187-188.

the Chinese of a clear end state that served both countries' interests, especially with regard to the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula and of the prisoner-of-war issue as an important precedent for future interventions.

There is no lack of literature on the failure to apply the end state concept successfully during the Vietnam War. Numerous military commentators cite the failure of political leaders to take sufficient advantage of military successes to find an easier way out, while political commentators portray an increasingly clouded environment where objectives of a "war of attrition" become more difficult to reach.²⁴ Perhaps the most important lesson in terms of the end state concept is that the more the end state depends on actors other than the U.S., such as RVN troops or the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people, the less likely the U.S. will be able to reach that end state in a defensible way. We can "declare victory" at any time we want, but the likelihood of achieving that victory decreases the more we define success in terms of results not subject directly to U.S. policy. Put another way, the U.S. could have declared victory at various times between 1957 and 1965 that would have allowed blame for any subsequent failures to be attributed to Saigon and allowed

²⁴ Kissinger, 700-701.

the U.S. to contain Soviet expansion in the region at other borders.²⁵

U.S. military interventions after Vietnam demonstrated that some lessons of Korea and Vietnam had been learned, though uncertainty about strategic limits on the use of force remained. The U.S. continued to define strategic end states in terms of winning the cold war, as reflected in the first two major military operations of the early 1980's: Grenada and Lebanon. The 1982-1984 deployment of U.S. forces in Lebanon most clearly demonstrated the inherent problem of applying strategic end states, like winning the Cold War or achieving Arab-Israeli peace, to military operations where such considerations hold no little or no relation to more immediate military objectives.

Lebanon: Not A Strategy, Just an Exit

The 1982-84 deployment of U.S. forces to Lebanon demonstrates several the dangers associated with poor end state planning. The U.S. deployed forces to Lebanon twice during this period, with radical differences between the two missions' end states. The end state of the first mission, in September 1982, included a specific end state achievable mainly by military actions (as opposed to diplomatic or

²⁵ Kissinger, 644-645.

economic actions). The end state of the second mission, from mid-September 1982 until February 1984, was far less specific and involved goals not achievable primarily by that military force. The Lebanon case reveals the weaknesses of a military deployment driven by drastic changes to strategic objectives, with little strategic attention to a military end state.

In August 1982, Israel's summer invasion of southern Lebanon and subsequent siege of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Beirut led to a situation requiring a third-party observer force to facilitate an end to the stand-off. As usual in the Middle East, both parties saw the U.S. as an honest broker that could help them resolve their problems. The U.S. obtained agreement from Tunisia and a few other Arab states to accept the PLO, leaving open only the question of how to facilitate an Israeli-PLO disengagement and subsequent departure of both forces from Lebanon.

The U.S. agreed to participate, along with France and Italy, in a Multi-National Force (MNF) of approximately 1500-2000 troops. Both parties to the conflict saw strong advantages in accepting the force: Israel saw no interest in a protracted struggle with mounting casualties when the MNF could facilitate the same result; and the PLO, having given up on using Lebanon as a base, was happy to agree to an MNF

withdrawal so long as families left behind in Beirut were protected.²⁶

U.S. leaders saw similar advantages in MNF participation. Officials at the State Department and NSC thought the MNF might provide a useful tool, in some undefined way, to support subsequent U.S. diplomatic actions in the region. Pentagon officials, wary of the potential dangers in an end state linked more to uncertain strategic objectives than to clearer, less ambitious measures obtained a 30-day limit for the deployment of U.S. forces. The mission was kept clear: to observe and facilitate the PLO's evacuation from Beirut, with broader diplomatic goals left to diplomats.²⁷ U.S. Marines began arriving in Beirut as part of the MNF on August 21. The MNF in Lebanon completed its evacuation mission 11 days early, and U.S. forces withdrew on September 10. Meanwhile, the U.S. began to implement President Reagan's September 1 Mideast peace initiative as part of an overall effort to improve regional stability by building on the MNF's success.

²⁶ Ralph Hallenbeck, Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), 28-30.

²⁷ David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 93-4.

On September 14, Beirut again fell into chaos with the assassination of Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel, a strong supporter of both U.S. and Israeli actions. Israel subsequently moved into Muslim West Beirut in coordination with Gemayel's forces. The re-entry of Israeli forces, and the subsequent massacre of 1000 Palestinians by Gemayel's forces on September 17, led the U.S. to redeploy a MNF contingent two days later.²⁸

Unlike the first MNF mission, the USMNF is one had neither specific military end state nor a time limit. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to deploying without these elements, but President Reagan and others quickly overruled them.²⁹ The success of the first MNF, as well as that of a 1958 deployment to restore order in Lebanon, led policy-makers to believe that a second MNF would not face many obstacles or require a long-term deployment. The new MNF's mission was clarified shortly thereafter, in response to Congressional concerns, as "to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide a multinational presence" at Lebanon's request. In other words, the Marines' mission was

²⁸ Most of the literature on the Lebanon deployment refers to this force as the "USMNF," although Italy and France continued to provide a nominal number of troops to the force.

²⁹ Hallenbeck, 28.

to "establish a presence," a phrase never before used in an operations order and one that made it difficult to define either an end state or measurable steps to reach it.³⁰

Although the Marines' mission was not clear, the size of the force seemed incongruous with the U.S. overall policy of seeing all foreign forces withdrawn from Lebanon.

After Jordan and the PLO rejected Reagan's diplomatic initiative in the spring of 1983, the Marines faced increasing opposition from Lebanese factions. A grenade attack in March 1983, followed by occasional gunfire incidents and the April 18 truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy, indicated the U.S. presence in Lebanon was no longer seen as a strong force for stability but, rather, as a vulnerable target symbolizing U.S. support for Israel and the Christian-controlled Lebanese government. The U.S. decision to support a peace treaty between those two governments in May only strengthened opposition motivation. By this point, the U.S. had neither the public support nor the military force needed either to stabilize Lebanon under the Gemayel government or to force Syria -- the sponsor of most of the anti-U.S. Lebanese factions -- to withdraw from Lebanon.

³⁰ Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Lebanon, 1982-84 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1985), 38.

U.S. officials nonetheless changed the strategic objective of Lebanon policy in the summer of 1983 from one of general stabilization to expulsion of foreign, meaning Syrian, forces. The MNF's mission was not changed, but the force became the subject of increasing opposition from pro-Syrian factions as a separate set of U.S. military advisors were dispatched to train government forces and the MNF was ordered to participate in joint Lebanese-American patrols.

AS the MNF approached its first anniversary, its end state remained unchanged despite serious degradations to its environment. On September 1, in response to U.S. Marines returning fire against attacks from the Shuf Mountains, Druze and Shia militia leaders formally declared the MNF to be their enemy.³¹ U.S. leaders responded by looking to increase military support for the LAF, culminating in naval gunfire on September 18 against a Shia-Druze attack on Suq al-Gharb in the Shuf near Beirut. LAF forces may or may not have been seriously threatened in this attack, but the LAF commander sent near-hysterical warnings of defeat. U.S. leaders interpreted the attack as a direct Syrian threat against Beirut and thus a direct threat to the U.S. strategic policy objective. The U.S. Marine commander, Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, realized that a U.S. response would destroy any

³¹ Hallenbeck, 74-78.

remaining appearance of U.S. neutrality but nonetheless acted to defend the LAF as required.³² The loss of neutrality proved fatal on October 23, little more than a month later, when a suicide truck bomb killed 241 Marines.

Even then, U.S. leaders refused to change the strategic policy objective or military end state to reduce risks for U.S. interests and forces. U.S. leaders exacerbated the risk by committing even more force to support the LAF and by interpreting developments as somehow caused by the Soviet Union.³³ U.S. strategic policy thus changed to one of preventing a Soviet takeover in Lebanon and the region. President Reagan justified the new objective in an October 27 television address by claiming MNF withdrawal might lead to the Middle East's absorption into the Soviet bloc.³⁴ The U.S. also deployed additional forces, including the battleship USS *New Jersey*; initiated plans for massive increases in LAF military aid and training; and signed a new defense cooperation agreement with Israel. None of these steps included specific measurable objectives: successful training

³² Hallenbeck, 81-84; Hammel, 217-221.

³³ The only evidence for such an argument lay in massive Soviet military aid to Syria following its massive losses to Israel in 1982. See Hallenbeck, 109-122.

³⁴ It is unclear how such a statement could be squared with the lack of U.S. military action to oppose Syria's control of Lebanon since 1976. See Hallenbeck, 109.

of the LAF, for example, would take at least 18 months under the most optimistic predictions. Not surprisingly, Pentagon objections coupled with Congressional unhappiness restrained the more robust U.S. plans.³⁵

U.S. self-defense operations, the closest thing to a Lebanon mission with a clear end state, continued to realize less than full success. Despite furor over the truck bomb, U.S. forces could not find Syrian targets worthy of retaliation. A December attempt to strike Syrian air defenses that harassed U.S. reconnaissance flights failed when Syria downed two U.S. planes while suffering no damage itself. By late January, when a massive Shia attack on Beirut cause a complete collapse of the LAF, the U.S. was left only with the options of withdrawing or initiating a massive ground offensive. Reagan announced on February 8 that the MNF would gradually withdraw, even as the *New Jersey* launched its most massive bombardment to date. Gemayel's public break with the U.S. in favor of Syria and Italy's withdrawal of its MNF contingent dashed any hopes for a smooth Marine withdrawal, and the last Marines left on February 27. About that time, Reagan finally made a definitive change to the military end state by declaring the

³⁵ Hallenbeck, 123-127.

mission of the Marines had been to prevent a Syrian-Israeli war: with that accomplished, they could leave successfully.³⁶

The Lebanon case demonstrates the dangers inherent in an ill-conceived and ever-changing set of strategic objectives, especially when accompanied by an unclear military end state. The first MNF deployment featured a specific strategic objective that facilitated a similarly specific military end state: the PLO's evacuation from Lebanon. In contrast, the end state of the second MNF deployment was subject to changing strategic objectives and diplomatic actions. As the strategic objective changed, the military end state should have changed as well, to conclude either with a well-planned withdrawal or an ambitious increase in offensive action. Instead, senior U.S. officials tried to change their strategic objective while relying on a static military mission of "presence" and ambiguous military end state of "stability." Had U.S. officials at least considered changes to the MNF's military end state alongside the strategic objective, the mission may have realized far greater success. In the Lebanon case, military planners could not address issues of transition to the diplomatic element of national power because that element, along with the strategic objective, continued to change. These ongoing changes also

³⁶ Hallenbeck, 127-132.

weakened the Administration's public affairs strategy, since public pronouncements did not include a clear military end state or any evidence of progress towards strategic goals.

Iraq: Transition from the Cold War to Something Else

As the Soviet threat disintegrated, U.S. officials searched for a new enemy and strategic center of gravity to guide U.S. military intervention. Without such a centralizing threat, the U.S. had difficulty finding standards by which to design sufficiently specific end states and measurable steps to reach them.

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait provided a basis for one model: former President Bush's well-known "new international order." The Bush Administration sought a collective security model in which the U.S. could lead a coalition against a common threat. That model required acceptance of end state limitations by other coalition partners, but U.S. officials considered such limits acceptable in that non-military policy tools (particularly political and economic sanctions) could yield other results beneficial to U.S. interests. In contrast to Lebanon, the U.S. would use military force under specific conditions for specific purposes.

In the case of Iraq, the most significant limitation on end state was the decision not to define "restoration of regional stability" as requiring the removal of Saddam's regime. This limit did not mean the U.S. was opposed to Saddam's overthrow; in fact, most U.S. political and military leaders were certain Saddam would not long survive his defeat. The assumption nonetheless led U.S. officials to believe military force was neither necessary, in terms of the military mission, nor desirable, in terms of coalition cohesion and Arab-Israeli peace efforts.

Thus, some aspects of end state were clear, including a decisive victory over Iraqi Republican Guard forces, the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty. The U.S. also included other strategic policy objectives reasonably simple to declare attained at the end of military operations, such as restoration of regional security and of free access to regional energy resources.

When Saddam did not fall as expected, and critics charged that U.S. forces should have gone to Baghdad, U.S. officials found themselves subject to serious public and Congressional criticism. Iraq policy still included limiting factors involving coalition cohesion and not occupying Baghdad. The contradiction, however, between statements of

veiled support for the Iraqi opposition and cease-fire conditions that facilitated Saddam's renewed repression of that opposition complicated U.S. efforts to declare victory. These complications affected subsequent U.S. regional military actions, including the Multilateral Interception Force and no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, by requiring broader end state conditions beyond the scope of the military missions. The ultimate strategic end state for these operations -- Saddam's overthrow, or his full acceptance of U.N. Security Council resolutions -- was not up to the military alone. Simply put, there were no criteria for a military end state, and barely any criteria for mission achievement beyond continuing operations.

As in Lebanon, the U.S. deployed forces in Iraq after Desert Storm in order to correct an unforeseen strategic policy failure following a successful, short-term military operation. The follow-on deployments indicate that no end state is sometimes better than one with inadequate forces conducting an overly restricted operation. In Lebanon, the overly ambitious end state for the second MNF led to increasing mission creep and eventual disaster; in Iraq, the lack of end state for no-fly zone enforcement led to a lengthy deployment of questionable strategic value.

This is not to say that more active use of military force for more strictly political purposes was not considered immediately after Desert Storm concluded. U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait Edward W. Gnehm, for example, requested that U.S. forces maintain a strong post-war presence in Kuwait as a means to encourage the Kuwaiti government towards greater democratization. Had this mission been accomplished, U.S. forces could have found themselves playing much the same role of a "stabilizing presence" as they found themselves playing in Lebanon in the 1980s. In Lebanon, post-MNF "stability" failures led to a follow-on "presence" mission; in Kuwait, the same "presence" would have been used to build on mission "success." Neither the actual Lebanon case nor the suggested Kuwaiti case saw effective end state planning applied to the military operation.

In general, however, the dialectic between Desert Storm's diplomatic and military end states facilitated effective implementation of strategic objectives and provided useful inputs for post-war objectives. The consistent strategic objectives of restoring Kuwait's sovereignty and regional stability led to a specific military end state, including expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destruction of the Republican Guard. That military end state led to post-war strategic and diplomatic objectives that

ensured a smooth transition from a military to a diplomatic focus. The eventual postwar U.N. mandate for intrusive action against Iraq, as realized in U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991, provided a clear set of objectives for use in public affairs strategy and for justification of future diplomatic and military options as necessary. On the negative side, the less specific discussion between military officers and political leaders about cease-fire terms, specifically Iraqi use of helicopters, led to major unanticipated problems and unclear end states over the following weeks and months.³⁷

The transition from military to diplomatic action may have been clouded by the imposition of no-fly zones and naval sanctions enforcement, but U.S. officials did not let those developments block implementation of the more important end state for Desert Storm. The productive discussion of strategic objectives, accompanied by consistent planning for military end state and diplomatic strategy, produced a successful conclusion.

Somalia: An End State of Exit

Like Lebanon ten years earlier, the U.S. intervention in Somalia fell into two separate phases. The limited nature of

³⁷ Fishel, 33-34.

the first deployment demonstrates a successful application of end state, even when another foreign force failed to achieve it. The broader nature of the second deployment, with a less specific end state not achievable by primarily military means, demonstrates how inadequate planning for transition and mismatch between military means and end states can lead to disaster.

The first phase of foreign intervention in Somalia during this period had a limited military end state within a broader strategic policy objective: a limited humanitarian relief mission, focused on securing delivery points and access, from August to November 1992. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomatic efforts sought more international donations and U.N. authorization for additional measures to ensure delivery of the relief.³⁸ Before this period, a limited U.N. force of 500 Pakistanis (out of an authorized 3000) deployed earlier in the summer had not improved security or stability.³⁹ U.S. leaders increasingly agreed on the need for a stronger intervention, offering in late November to provide the U.N. with up to 28,000 U.S. troops for a stabilization force. The U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 794 on December 3,

³⁸ Herman J. Cohen, "Intervention in Somalia," in Allan E. Goodman, The Diplomatic Record, 1992-1993, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 61.

³⁹ Robert G. Patman, The U.N. Operation in Somalia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 92.

authorizing the U.S.-led, multinational United Task Force (UNITAF) "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations."⁴⁰

President Bush and then-U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali corresponded about the need for a "smooth transition" from UNITAF to a follow-on U.N. force likely to be deployed in late January 1993. Journalists and other observers, however, questioned the design and objectives of both missions. If UNITAF succeeded in its mission, why subsequently deploy a U.N. force? And, if the U.N. force was necessary to ensure sufficient security, how would UNITAF be able to accomplish its mission? The issue of UNITAF lacking an achievable end state with measurable achievements foreshadowed deep problems with U.S. policy. Perhaps the most ominous comment came from U.S. Ambassador Smith Hempstone, just finishing his tour in nearby Kenya, in the pages of a U.S. news magazine: "If you liked Beirut (in 1983), you'll love Somalia."⁴¹

By mid-December, the U.S. strategic policy objective of delivering relief had moved past the initial military end

⁴⁰ UNSCR 794, reprinted in John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995), 179. Unlike UNOSOM and other U.N. forces in Somalia, UNITAF was a multinational force not under U.N. command and control.

⁴¹ Smith Hempstone, "Think Three Times Before You Embrace the Somali Tarbaby," "U.S. News and World Report," December 14, 1992, 30.

state of delivering sufficient relief to avoid an ongoing mass famine.⁴² The new objective was enunciated by Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen to a House Committee on December 17, 1992: "All our good works could go for naught if we do not follow through on the long and difficult process of reconstituting Somalia's civil society and government."⁴³ This objective did not seem unreasonable for U.S. diplomacy in a small African country, especially when U.S. military force was available to provide stability and foster an environment for diplomatic success. U.S. diplomat Robert Oakley, for example, had little trouble convincing Somali warlords in early December to restrain their militias rather than risking defeat to the arriving U.S. forces.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, the U.S. military operation did not include plans for such unrestricted missions. From the beginning, the military end state aimed at obtaining a secure environment with a minimal use of force in as short a time as possible, regardless of the will or capability within Somalia. The U.S. government sought to assign the stability

⁴² For more on estimates by European NGO's that the worst of the famine had passed by late November, see John G. Sommer, Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia, 1990-1994 (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 70-73.

⁴³ Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, December 17, 1992, 7.

⁴⁴ Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions, (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1998), 23.

mission to the follow-on United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) because (1) the mission appeared well within the capabilities of such a force and (2) President Bush had no wish to saddle the incoming Clinton administration with such a deployment of U.S. forces. These assumptions superceded approval of a detailed end state for U.S. forces to transition to UNOSOM. On December 9, the same day that U.S. forces began to arrive in Somalia, Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs James Wood told a House Committee that UNITAF's departure and UNOSOM's arrival "have to be brought into sync, and right now all of the details are not worked out."⁴⁵

The Somalia case saw military end state subordinated to difficult diplomatic objectives, at the cost of underplaying demonstrable progress. Whatever UNITAF might have accomplished, a transition to a far weaker UNOSOM would put those accomplishments at risk. Diplomatic objectives that relied on the "good will" of the warlords to surrender arms and negotiate their differences were hardly realistic complements to a short-term force like UNITAF. Thus, the eventual U.S. end state for UNITAF -- establishment of "a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief" -

⁴⁵ Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 9, 1992, 28-29.

- required a commitment from U.S. leaders to promise U.S. forces in support of UNOSOM should the need arise. Defense Secretary Cheney and JCS Chief General Powell made just such a promise at a December 4 briefing at the Pentagon.⁴⁶

The Clinton administration made no change in this strategy upon taking office. The only measurable factor in U.S. military end state for UNOSOM lay in the number of forces provided: 15-20 per cent for UNOSOM, down from 85-90 per cent of UNITAF. UNITAF transferred its mission to UNOSOM in May 1993 despite continuing Somali challenges to the "secure humanitarian environment." Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts to coopt the most dangerous warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed, into the nation-building effort failed. Aideed instead bided his time, waiting only one month after UNITAF's departure to confront UNOSOM and kill 24 Pakistani soldiers on a pre-arranged inspection.

The U.S. supported the U.N. decision to hold Aideed responsible but refused to support a request from Jonathan Howe, U.N. Special Representative to Somalia, for U.S. military forces trained for "hostage rescue and for tracking and detaining individuals."⁴⁷ Aideed's forces continued to

⁴⁶ Brune, 28.

⁴⁷ Jonathan T. Howe, "U.S.-U.N. Relations in Dealing with Somalia," paper delivered to Princeton University conference on "Learning From Operation Restore Hope: Somalia Revisited," April 1995, 16-17.

attack U.N. personnel, including 5000 U.S. troops over the following months. Although Howe requested better U.S. equipment and troops, and obtained some, Congressional frustration with Aideed's continued attacks led Defense Secretary Aspin in September to refuse Howe's request for tanks and armored vehicles. Aideed's forces killed 18 U.S. soldiers a month later, and U.S. officials (perhaps recalling the ineffective escalation in Lebanon ten years earlier) announced that U.S. forces would leave by March 1994. U.S. forces returned to the region in March 1995 to protect UNOSOM's withdrawal.

The U.S. did not achieve its military or diplomatic end states in Somalia because of insufficient commitment and coordination at several levels. A military end state to create a temporarily secure environment for relief delivery in late 1992 might have been possible. Some relief officials suggest that the worst of the famine had already passed by that point, a fact that U.S. leaders could have justified as mission success in reaching military end state and in making a transition to a diplomatic effort free of the opposition generated by a military deployment. Similarly, Clinton administration officials could have defined an end state for UNOSOM, or at least its U.S. component, as the capture or marginalization of Aideed if they had deployed sufficient

assets. Instead, the Bush and Clinton administrations share responsibility for the Somalia disaster because neither designed a military end state defensible either within the U.S. or abroad.

In that sense, the failure of each administration to achieve its respective strategic policy objective in Somalia is secondary. Neither had a chance to build Somalia as a nation because neither was willing to commit sufficient personnel, equipment, or effort even to the initial military end state of a secure environment for delivering humanitarian relief. As in Lebanon, Somalia saw U.S. officials try to pursue diplomatic options by relying on stability created by the presence of U.S. forces. The unclear military end state for those forces meant that their deployment could only end when more political efforts achieved success. Instead, strategic ambitions and supporting diplomatic actions produced increasing opposition to U.S. forces, blocking progress on both the diplomatic and military efforts and making the overall policy harder to justify in public. As in Lebanon, such "stability" missions cannot maintain the same end state and expect a successful transition to diplomatic action.

Haiti: The Importance of Getting End State Right

If the Iraq case shows how military end state can successfully improve strategic policy end state in a major war, the U.S. military deployment to Haiti between 1994 and 1996 provides a similar lesson for a smaller-scale operation. Despite changing strategic policy goals before and after the deployment, the clearer military end state and measurable steps to achieve it yielded useful results which reduced threats to U.S. interests and facilitated a successful transition to a U.N. force. The operation also proved that effective military planning could handle even as serious an event as a change in the initial environment from non-permissive to semi-permissive.

U.S. strategic policy goals for Haiti in 1994 and 1995 were clear enough for military operations, though the means to accomplish broader issues of regional stability and democratization were not nearly so clear. After General Raoul Cedras overthrew the semi-democratic regime of Jean-Claude Aristide in 1991, U.S. strategic policy objectives focused on the problems the Cedras regime could create in terms of refugees and regional destabilization. It would take three more years of diplomatic and economic sanctions before U.S. officials would fully consider a military option.

Even before the U.S. began to contemplate military action, diplomatic officials were worried about the regional

"domino" effect of a situation like Haiti. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson, "every time democracy is threatened by the military in this hemisphere, it sends off potential shockwaves. We want to make clear that this kind of behavior has a terrible price."⁴⁸ At that time, U.S. policy and diplomatic goals sought to use such measures as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation to reverse the coup. The policy end state in this period was fairly general: as Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger put it in May 1992, "if you're looking for a clear, precise road map of how this is going to change the situation, I can't give it to you."⁴⁹ In contrast to Somalia, Bush administration officials saw no need to bring the Haiti issue to closure before Clinton's inauguration in 1993 despite Clinton's criticism of a "heartless" Bush policy towards refugees. The difference was military: U.S. forces were deployed in Somalia, but were not in Haiti.

These efforts seemed to bear fruit in the July 1993 Governors Island Agreement, under which Cedras agreed to step down in favor of Aristide by October 30. The U.S. then led

⁴⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Suspends Assistance to Haiti and Refuses to Recognize Junta," *New York Times*, October 2, 1991, A1.

⁴⁹ Lee Hockstader, "OAS Move Seen Unlikely to Trigger Shift in Haiti," *Washington Post*, May 20, 1992, A27.

the U.N. Security Council to pass Resolution 841, which established a United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to provide an international umbrella for intervention in Haiti. Resolution 841 was blocked, however, when both the Cedras regime and Aristide refused to adhere to the Governors Island Agreement.

This refusal was especially critical to blocking implementation of those elements of the Agreement that required military action. One of the most critical early objectives, for example, was the retraining of the Haitian military to serve as a combined police force and engineer corps. The U.S. and Canada sent military experts in police and engineering issues to Haiti in mid-October aboard the USS *Harlan County* to initiate the retraining plan. This first military operation on Haiti itself had at least one clear mission: to land safely in a permissive environment. When armed thugs loyal to Cedras prevented the *Harlan County* from docking on October 11, military leaders decided to abandon the landing attempt rather than try to land with insufficient military force or mission specifics. Contrary to the Lebanon and Somalia experiences, where U.S. officials kept military forces in place despite increasingly serious threats from the

local population, U.S. officials wisely decided after the *Harlan County* episode to reassess the situation.⁵⁰

The *Harlan County* episode caused U.S. leaders to abandon plans for permissive military operations and return to a strategy of renewed economic and diplomatic pressure to achieve change in Haiti. Again, the strategic policy and diplomatic end states were less than clear, and the means to reach them even cloudier. Meanwhile, the refugee issue continued to provide a key U.S. policy determinant from domestic sources, especially African-American leaders sympathetic to Haitians and politicians from Florida determined not to accept any further refugees. By the summer of 1994, with non-military operations continuing to yield no results, U.S. leaders turned to a military strategy that included more specific end states in the form of exit strategies.

The U.S. secured passage on July 31 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, which authorized two means to facilitate implementation of the Agreement: (1) a Multinational Force (MNF) for six months, to include as many as 6000 troops; and (2) a redesignated UNMIH to assume the MNF's functions after that period. The two-pronged strategy

⁵⁰ Events in Somalia may have caused the reassessment decision in Haiti, in that the infamous killing of 18 U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu occurred only a week before the *Harlan County* episode.

reflected a U.S. strategic objective of limiting the duration of a military mission by ensuring an existing U.N. force would succeed it. The resolution 940 even placed a seven-month timeframe on UNMIH for reaching the diplomatic objective of sufficient change in Haiti to satisfy UNMIH's conditions.⁵¹

U.S. officials simultaneously began more formal planning for an invasion, with Clinton approving a timetable on August 19 and the plans themselves a week later. By September the administration had fully developed plans for both a military invasion (OPLAN 2370) and a "permissive" entry (OPLAN 2380).⁵² Both missions carried the same intermediate and final military end states: in the near term, to secure facilities in Port-au-Prince and elsewhere that would allow MNF operations to go forward; and over the longer-term, to achieve sufficient stability and change within six months to allow a smooth transfer to UNMIH. The longer-term end state was understandably less specific due to differences in nearer-term end state, but both end states were far more measurable and achievable than the broader policy goal.

⁵¹ U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 (1994); reprinted in John R. Ballard, Upholding Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997 (Westport, CA: Praeger, 1998).

⁵² Ballard, 74.

These advantages exemplify the critical lesson from the Haiti experience: military end states help maximize the effectiveness of military operations, and they improve complementary diplomatic and strategic policy goals. Intensified diplomatic efforts in Haiti after the initial insertion of U.S. forces focused on the military end-state: establishment of conditions for transition from MNF to UNMIH. This focus buttressed U.S. efforts aimed at obtaining sufficient foreign participation in UNMIH to convince UNSC members to extend its mandate. The UNSC extended UNMIH's mandate twice, in January and July 1995, including specific language to "professionalize the Haitian Armed Forces" that reflected the same mission as that held by U.S. and Canadian experts in the 1994 *Harlan County* incident.⁵³ Moreover, the successful transition from the MNF to UNMIH in March 1996 allowed the U.S. to "declare victory" without regard to UNMIH's eventual strategic success or failure in Haiti.

Put another way, the MNF's specific, achievable end states let U.S. leaders attribute subsequent problems in Haiti to Aristide, UNMIH, or other factors, rather than to the U.S. or MNF. Defense Secretary Perry and JCS Chief General Shalikashvili clearly had this idea in mind in

⁵³ UNSCRs 975 and 1007; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, November 6, 1995, S/1995/922, 27.

responding to Congressional calls in late September for specific "exit strategies" and withdrawal dates. Perry and Shalikashvili thought it too early for the MNF to set fixed dates for withdrawal.

For the operation to succeed ... with minimal risk to U.S. personnel, our military forces need to proceed with achieving objectives, not meeting fixed deadlines. The success of the operation to date is due largely to the force commander having the freedom both to devise and to implement military plans and to make necessary adjustments as circumstances change on the ground. A fixed end date would deprive us of this advantage. More important, a legislatively required withdrawal date would change the dynamic on the ground and affect the actions of our friends and those who oppose us... The bottom line is that the dynamic created by a mandated withdrawal date could make the situation more dangerous to our troops.⁵⁴

In Haiti, the specific end state for the military operation helped U.S. leaders focus ongoing diplomatic actions and improve post-deployment planning. U.S. efforts within the U.N. and the Organization of American States (OAS) helped U.S. partners understand and agree on common goals: not specifically for the benefit of Haiti, but for improvements important to regional stability and U.S. interests. The return of some minimal semblance of legitimate government, in the form of the Aristide regime, was more important to the U.S. and its partners than "nation-building" or other, more ambitious goals. Whereas the U.S.

⁵⁴ Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 28, 1994.

ignored the importance of such partnerships in Lebanon and Somalia, the Haiti case demonstrates how a clear military end state with international support can shape national strategic goals and refine U.S. diplomatic efforts. Such influence from the military end state can smooth the transition to diplomatic elements of national power and strengthen prospects for strategic objectives. It also can provide evidence of policy "success," subject to political interpretation, to buttress public affairs strategies.

Conclusion: End States, Adjustments, and Transitions

The deployments of the 1980s and 1990s reveal a contrast between U.S. diplomatic strategies and military doctrine. The diplomatic strategies often began with a strategic end state of "restoring stability," at least to a point where vital U.S. interests are no longer threatened. The enemy's defeat became a secondary issue, partially because diplomatic strategies generally rest on cooperation and consultation more than imposing a state's will.

In contrast, U.S. military doctrine held to its traditional focus on the enemy, including enemy-held objectives and enemy-utilized centers of gravity. Mission accomplishment and end state was defined in terms of defeating the enemy, leaving broader aspects of "end state"

to officials at the strategic level. Most importantly, military leaders saw their respective missions as imposing U.S. will and forcing the enemy to abandon unacceptable courses of action, rather than the strategic goal of creating stable circumstances not dependent on U.S. forces. The net result was a shifting set of conditions for strategic objectives, leaving both military and diplomatic planners uncertain as to how to plan transition from military to diplomatic action.

Military end state planning can help resolve this uncertainty. The Lebanon and Somalia cases share a common confusion about strategic end state, especially with regard to the end of military force as the primary instrument of national power involved. The Iraq and Haiti cases, however, demonstrate how military planners can use end state to facilitate planning for implementing strategic objectives and for transition to postwar diplomatic action.

The case studies show that effective military end state planning requires several elements beyond those found in doctrine:

(1) Military end states drive strategic planning and transition to diplomacy. All four cases, and many more like them, reflect an ambiguity in strategic planning. Even the Iraq case, in many ways the best example of U.S. goals and

limits in military operations, left the ultimate end state undefined except in the most general terms. Simply put, U.S. leaders have little if any idea how to "attain victory" or "restore stability" when planning military operations. In cases like Iraq and Haiti, they ask military leaders to draft end states for their review. In cases like Lebanon and Somalia, they provide only the broadest sense of end state so as not to limit diplomatic or strategic actions. The first two cases are consistent with military doctrine requirements for end state planning; the latter two cases are not.

Military end state planning has effects beyond military operations, however. Military end state plans, with their requisite links to operations and concrete achievements, can specify the military element's contribution to achieving strategic objectives in a given situation. Desert Storm's end state addressed the operation's initial objectives but not subsequent issues like weapons of mass destruction, and Haiti's end state addressed issues related to the follow-on U.N. mission that had already been discussed in Washington. In contrast, both the Lebanon and Somalia longer-term deployments never included specific end state elements like the initial ones of PLO evacuation and security for famine relief, respectively. Had the second deployments in either case defined which end state elements could and could not

have been achieved by military operations, policy discussions in Washington might have better addressed failed assessments and changed the "presence" missions. Problems in the simultaneous diplomatic actions might also have been highlighted in ways requiring changes to either military or diplomatic planning. Similarly, successes in moving towards military end state provide important evidence for use in public affairs strategy justifying both the policy and the actions to implement it.

(2) Changes in strategic objective may require changes to military end states. Military end states unquestionably require some degree of flexibility, but both political leaders and military commanders generally want clear goals before any operation begins. The four case studies show that problems arise when military end states based on those initial objectives are not reassessed when local opposition to U.S. forces increases. The problem is especially acute for "presence" missions where strategic objectives change, as in Lebanon or Somalia. The Iraq case, in contrast, demonstrates how refusal to adjust military end state in the face of political criticism can reinforce the transition to the diplomatic element of national power. The Haiti case shows that even when initial conditions unexpectedly change,

like the Cedras regime's acquiescence, military plans can change to reach the same end state.

(3) Stability may not be a military end state.

Stability is a standard term for strategic objectives and diplomatic end states, and therefore is subject to political interpretation. The four case studies indicate successful military-diplomatic transition requires a separation of those elements of stability that do not require the presence or use of U.S. military force. Grouping all elements of stability under a mission of "presence," as in Somalia or Haiti, makes military end state planning difficult. Separating stability elements into military and diplomatic subsets, as with U.N. resolutions in Iraq or Haiti, can help military planners suggest transition conditions that yield effective diplomatic responses and reinforce strategic objectives.

None of these elements means U.S. strategic policy plays a reduced role after deployment of U.S. military force. The tendency in U.S. leadership circles to "let the army fight without political interference" does not account for the military's function as a policy instrument, nor does it account for the political context surrounding an enemy or hostile environment.⁵⁵ Military interventions can envelop and

⁵⁵ Clausewitz, 617-18.

overcome enemies, but such actions yield few benefits unless accomplished within a clear strategic framework.

Current U.S. military doctrine touches on transition and related issues in planning for "military operations other than war." This doctrine emphasizes the potential need for commanders to "realign forces or adjust force structure;" plan to play a supporting role to U.S. or international agencies; or plan for giving control of a situation to civil authorities or support truce negotiations.⁵⁶ Each of these adjustments, if properly planned and approved in the chain of command, would facilitate review of strategic and diplomatic end states at the same time.

Both the Iraq and Haiti cases provide effective examples of transition. In Iraq, the strategic objective of maintaining international legitimacy for Desert Storm led to continued focus on U.N. action, including Resolution 687, beyond the end of the war.⁵⁷ In Haiti, effective transition planning helped U.S. officials avoid both domestic calls for an exit date and possible "mission creep" from Haitian developments. Even the Somalia and Lebanon cases provide examples of effective transition, in that each intervention

⁵⁶ Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, IV-11 to IV-12.

⁵⁷ The importance of such a mandate became clear in later U.N. conduct, under 687, of weapons inspections, sanctions enforcement, and humanitarian relief.

began with specific, achievable missions that aimed for transition back to an acceptable *status quo ante*. The second phases of intervention in those cases, respectively, shows that insufficient focus on transition plans removes a key impetus for policy review and adjustment.

In a similar way, military end states can provide key inputs for planning the departure of U.S. forces without wandering into an "exit strategy" that seeks exit for exit's sake. U.S. officials at the strategic and diplomatic levels must bear in mind the limits of military force, especially as a strategic tool. Once U.S. leaders decide to use military force, the U.S. holds a vital interest in bringing that operation to an end as quickly as possible. Sometimes, this means ending the operation short of permanent solving all the relevant issues, as in Haiti and Iraq. A military end state defensible to both U.S. and foreign audiences can energize international support for subsequent U.N. or other actions and invigorate domestic support for the original U.S. military operation.

U.S. interests generally look towards stability: enhancing it (generally through economic cooperation), maintaining it (political relations and security assistance), restoring it (coercive military action), and justifying all those actions through a public affairs strategy. Should the

situation reach the point that U.S. leaders consider the deployment of military force, early design and approval of a coherent military end state provides military, diplomatic, and strategic advantages. A defined end state, with measurable steps towards achieving it, will clarify points where strategic and diplomatic objectives are too general or unrealistic for military operations. Further detailing of those objectives ensures unity of effort among all elements of national power, as in the Iraq case, or at least separates strategic tasks into "essential" and "desirable" categories, as in Haiti. Put another way, U.S. leaders can define the end states of military operations "so minimally that it will be easy to meet them, declare victory, and go home."⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Johanna McGeary, "Did the American Mission Matter?", *Time*, February 19, 1996, 36.

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