
CALL Public Access DB Page
Information

Document: RWP-02-236806
 Fileroom Folder: 1990-1999/1997/VOL LXXVII, NO. 6 - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1997 -
 Title: 04, PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
 Page Name: 1

swa. html at www- cgsc. army. mil Page 1 of 9

[http:// www- cgsc. army. mil/ milrev/ milrvweb/ nov/ swa. html](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html) 3/ 6/ 98

Peace Enforcement Operations

by Colonel Charles H. Swannack Jr., US Army, and Lieutenant

Colonel David R. Gray, US Army

Reacting

to a growing number of regional conflicts and humanitarian concerns, the Clinton administration unveiled a revised national security strategy in July 1994 to meet " new world order." The neo- Wilsonian strategy of enlargement calls for the work of democratic institutions and human rights. Prevention of conflict's root cause international partnerships to promote collective security are the new strategy's promote the use of multilateral peace operations, a combination of prevention and reestablish peace and stability in strife- torn areas. 1 Peace operations, despite title, rely on military force as an integral means to achieve policy goals.

Peace operations interject politically neutral military forces into contested areas and conflicts. From a military perspective, peace operations take two forms: peacekeeping and peace enforcement (PE). Undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties, they are noncombat operations that help implement the terms of an existing truce settlement. Peacekeepers do not use force except in self- defense. PE operations are perhaps they best suit the warmaking orientation of most conventional forces. Framed by rules of engagement (ROE), PE involves the threat or use of armed intervention to compel belligerents to comply with international sanctions or resolutions. Military forces must conduct a wide range of missions from nonviolent shows of force to deliberate operations within established ROE. 2

Last summer, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) [ID (L)] 2d " Warrior" Brigade had the opportunity to practice its PE skills during Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana, Rotation 9- 94. JRTC's realistic scenario replicated deploying a combat force (JTF) into an operational area similar to Bosnia- Herzegovina or Somalia, where civil war and competing insurgencies have caused untold human misery. Acting under a UN mandate, TF Warrior's PE mission was to separate belligerents, clear a buffer zone, provide humanitarian assistance (HA) and set the conditions for a relief in place by UN operations. Evolving doctrinal frameworks as a guide, 2d Brigade adapted its operations to the conditions, successfully completing all assigned missions. 3 Although the rotational issues for further doctrinal study, the brigade's effectiveness was directly dependent on how well it translated broad political guidance into measurable military objectives which

- Implement a viable plan to separate the belligerents.
- Enforce the buffer zone.
- Assist nongovernment agencies with their HA efforts.
- Integrate a positive public affairs- media campaign to influence the populace.

A Challenging Political- Military Framework

The training scenario involved an international border dispute based on historic

swa. html at www- cgsc. army. mil Page 2 of 9

[http:// www- cgsc. army. mil/ milrev/ milrvweb/ nov/ swa. html](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html) 3/ 6/ 98

between two countries on the fictional island of Aragon. After a fierce civil war, the citizens had declared their independence from the mother country of Cortina. The government eventually recognized the split as legitimate but disputed Acadia's claim

border regions. To reinforce their own claims, both sides postured heavily armed border and threatened further hostilities. The belligerents requested UN intervene to break the impasse. Acadia and Cortina mutually agreed to a cease-fire and a UN-supervised buffer zone along the disputed areas. However, besides the bell military forces, a bewildering array of nongovernment organizations (NGOs), ins refugees further convoluted the tactical environment within the proposed buffer The terrorist actions and hit-and-run tactics of two major insurgent groups, t

Acadian Freedom

Fighters (AFF)

and the

Cortinian Liberation Front (CLF),

represented a particularly troublesome

threat to the peace process. Capable of influencing world opinion within a momen media organizations maintained a constant presence and readiness to publicize an incidents- even if it meant sabotaging peaceful conflict resolution. Thus, the s Warrior in the Aragon heartland represented a confusing mixture of actors whose activities complicated clear-cut decision making and military action.

Italian soldiers search a

man suspected of setting

fires in a Sarajevo

suburb, March 1996.

As in most real-world

peace operations, a UN

mandate provided the

legal authority and

framework for future PE

efforts in Aragon. The

basis of the UN strategy,

as described in Mandate

3161, was to rely on a

mixture of restraint,

coercion and, if

necessary, compellence to

entice the belligerents to

peacefully resolve their

differences. Toward that

end, the mandate's

military clauses outlined five essential PE tasks and defined the ROE. Besides e

cease-fire's terms, UN peace enforcers were to remove all belligerent military

zone, assist in clearing mines and conducting mine-awareness training, coordina

exchange of prisoners of war and aid HA. Further refined by the JTF commander, R

use of force. Despite their allowance for the inherent right of self-defense, t

application of combat power in certain instances.

The tactical environment's nature caused TF members to adopt a new, and for many

psychological mind-set. Unlike combat operations, which prize audacity and aggr

requires soldiers to be more circumspect and discerning of their immediate envir

swa. html at www-cgsc.army.mil Page 3 of 9

<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html> 3/6/98

injuring noncombatants and escalating the level of violence. If the UN strategy

"Tropic Lightning" soldiers would function more as a police force than as warri

to Aragon, the TF adjusted its training program to address peace operation-pecu

disciplined ROE application and build soldiers' confidence in their ability to o

circumstances.

The upcoming operation's constabulary nature caused slight modifications to the

training program. Having thoroughly analyzed the mission's particulars, subordin

they were able to integrate many PE tasks within their existing mission- essential. At the small- unit level, emphasis remained on expert execution of battle drills. The battalion conducted PE lane training for its squads and platoons, focusing on establishing a checkpoint and cordon and search operations. In each scenario, so leaders had to react to the needs of civilian refugees as well as respond to tri- media representatives. 4 During "orders days," battalion and brigade staffs ana practiced the deliberate decision- making process. A TF- level field training ex conventional offensive and defensive tactics, capped off six months' preparation mission.

PE Operations Logic

Successful PE operations require seizure of the physical and moral high ground w area. However, before the actual commitment of combat forces, commanders must id operation's center of gravity (COG). 5 The belligerents clearly derive their di position and military freedom of action by occupying disputed areas within the b Controlling the buffer zone and its surrounding area is the key to separating th hostilities and equalizing negotiating leverage. Interposition of UN- backed mil both a physical and psychological barrier in preventing belligerents from resumi threat of retaliatory military strikes further serves as a potent incentive for serious negotiations.

Like keys that unlock a barred door, both terrain- and force- oriented decisive PE's operational COG. 6 Withdrawal of all belligerents, disarmament of paramilit checkpoints by UN forces and protection of civilians are critical to buffer zone tactical situation at the time of the military intervention, available combat fo infrastructure's condition will determine whether it is possible to seize all de simultaneously or sequentially. Limited helicopter sorties, the distance from th to objective areas and the need to secure a flight landing strip (FLS) as a lod TF Warrior sequence its initial assaults against terrain- oriented decisive poin was secure and contact made with belligerent checkpoints,

Warrior

combat elements could then

concentrate against the "flesh and blood" decisive points.

Commanders must tailor their level of efforts against specific force- oriented d

AFF

and

CLF

insurgent group activities became an irritating distraction because their action sabotage both military and HA, which intensified pressure on each belligerent's buffer zone to protect their nationals. Once the JTF declared the insurgents "h employed active search and attack operations to destroy them. Thus, while small insurgents' activities had broader political implications for gaining overall bu necessitating a robust TF response. The insurgents' actions can have an almost m attracting friendly combat counterresponses. However, command- ers must stay att

swa. html at www-cgsc.army.mil Page 4 of 9

<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html> 3/ 6/ 98

mission's principal focus- buffer zone occupation between two hostile belligerent frittering away combat power against secondary targets.

Translating these abstract operational concepts into practical "effectiveness" be especially challenging. The 25th ID (L) staff developed several useful guide measure its progress. Each subordinate element used a series of indicators such violations, hostile contacts with friendly forces and civilian refugee flow to c picture as illustrated by Figure 1. As they tracked the event flow, units assign each subcategory. Besides its qualities as an analytical tool, the matrix furthe broad nature into more understandable and manageable subtasks.

These conceptual and practical "road maps" guided the brigade TF in developing approaches. In occupying a position between the belligerents and placing primary

lines of communication, the brigade's buffer zone entry and occupation resembled operation. Before inserting conventional military forces, Special Operations For a site survey and exploited all intelligence sources for information about the a SOF then provided the TF with their findings. Introducing conventional forces in involves phasing TF elements into the buffer zone. Following the insertion of co established and expanded a lodgment before attempting to separate the belligerent buffer zone's length and width and eventually establish the conditions for a wit voluntary encirclement throughout the operation, peace enforcers place themselves tactical position between hostile forces. 7

By coordinating their actions through Mixed Military Working Groups (MMWGs), TF their initial vulnerability. Representatives from the UN, each belligerent and t in a neutral setting to discuss a range of issues. The driving force behind the develop mutual trust and cooperation among all parties through negotiation and l important, MMWGs provided a useful tool to hold belligerents to their cease- fir any other national political agreements.

During the training rotation, the brigade participated in four MMWG meetings and forum to coordinate a variety of issues, including:

- The insertion of friendly forces.
- Routine use of nonrestricted air space.
- Withdrawal time tables.

Another method of reducing risk was to swiftly mass TF combat elements against t points. This also enhanced force protection. As they entered the AO, friendly fo against the buffer zone's critical terrain, establishing initial defensive posit belligerent interference with entry operations. Securing FLSs, controlling main and establishing a lodgment constituted the first phase of the operation, which by expansion into the buffer zone as the TF's combat power was built. Lacking co stripped the enemy of tactical advantages. Rapid massing of forces on terrain- o points and speed of execution minimized the TF's own tactical handicaps. It was responsibility to coordinate these actions with the belligerent factions at the minimize potential violent confrontations.

Consistent with these concepts, TF Warrior's PE operations began with two battal

swa. html at www- cgsc. army. mil Page 5 of 9

[http:// www- cgsc. army. mil/ milrev/ milrvweb/ nov/ swa. html](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html) 3/ 6/ 98

assaults into its AO. TF Regular (4- 22 IN) seized the FLS while TF

Gimlet

(1- 21 IN) air- assaulted

directly into the buffer zone to begin relief of checkpoints. Team Chuck, a bala infantry company team formed around Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regim down the TF's MSR to clear mines and provide route security for subsequent groun the FLS secured by N+ 3, the rest of TF Warrior began airland operations to esta expand a lodgment. TF Golden Dragon (1- 14 IN) swiftly marshaled its lead units overland by foot and vehicle to assume a sector astride both sides of the buffer western flank. As combat power accrued, the battalion TFs moved to relieve belli in the buffer zone.

Checkpoint operations and belligerent withdrawal followed the guidelines from a checklist. Relief of belligerent checkpoints required centralized planning and c staffs but decentralized execution by small- unit leaders. At a MMWG meeting, al exact format for the checkpoint relief. Sergeants, lieutenants and captains then belligerent counterparts to take control of these terrain- oriented decisive poi Cortin- ians nor the Acadians would abandon their positions until they were assu enforcers had enough combat power to protect the civilian nationals in the area. belligerents moved out of the buffer area. Tracking withdrawing belligerents was difficult but critical task. On some occasions, belligerents would not willingly instructions to leave their checkpoints. In such instances, the TF commander had preconceived and coordinated actions to compel the belligerents to comply.

TF

Warrior

developed a series of graduated military power escalations to deal with noncompliant belligerents. The TF's "escalation ladder," depicted in Figure 2, aimed to establish a situation by communicating a threat backed by sufficient combat power and the UN authority. Each deterrent action must be, and was, applied impartially and with sufficient psychological willpower, each threat's credibility is directly proportional to the graduated application of force risks becoming stereotyped. Belligerents may decide to discover which activities will elicit a response and which will not separate the belligerents then becomes an act of high-pressure, tension-producing. Belligerents refuse to leave, and the JTF commander approves the use of actual combat reaches a point of no return. Peace enforcers are unlikely to regain the belligerent has been shed in combat. After combat actions have been initiated, TFs must then apply overwhelming force to separate belligerents or remove them from the buffer zone. Actions carry larger political implications.

The TF tested its escalation model against both belligerents at JRTC. The lower graduated responses worked well enough to entice the Cortinians to leave TF Regu in TF Gimlet's AO, the Acadians refused to leave two checkpoints and had to be ejected. This led to a breakdown in negotiations. TF Warrior then adopted a defensive posture possible Acadian attack. Reverting to conventional military operations, they repulsed a combined arms attack; then counterattacked to drive the reluctant belligerent from the buffer zone and adjoining control zones. Combat operations were, however, only one brigade's equation for conducting successful PE operations.

swa.html at www-cgsc.army.mil Page 6 of 9

<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html> 3/6/98

Marines in Haiti

prepare to deploy to

roadblock sites from

Cap Haitain, October

1993.

PE Operations'

Moral

Dimensions

The success of peace

operations depends on

rapid deployment of

combat forces, the

creation of a buffer zone

and the occupation of the

moral and psychological high ground. As an instrument of policy, the TF must integrate these facets into its operational game plan to gain the local inhabitants' trust and continue sustaining US domestic support. All TF actions must be perceived as neutral, always supporting the peace process. Forging a partnership with civilian agencies to assist in conducting a positive public affairs (PA) campaign provide two key means to capture the initiative in PE operations.

Civilian governmental, NGOs and private volunteer agencies (PVAs) will often provide support forces into crisis areas when UN peace operations take place. Many of these agencies established a close rapport with the belligerents and their local nationals in their efforts often represent the only hope to hungry, battered civilians in war-torn areas. In its own role as benefactor, the TF must form a close civil-military partnership with which will help ensure unity of effort and implementation of effective HA programs. The first step in synchronizing HA efforts requires civilian and military components to have a common appreciation of each others' capabilities, which should lead to a greater mutual respect. The TF relied on both personal contacts and improvised organizational relationships.

developing a common perspective with civilian counterparts. Exhibiting a friendly approach, soldiers and their leaders met, coordinated and cooperated with civilians as they helped conflict victims throughout the AO. To conduct continuous liaison officials in the towns of Carnis and Jetertown, the TF formed "Team Village," a civil affairs, counterintelligence, chaplaincy and preventive medicine personnel coordination cell- composed of the 225th Forward Support Battalion (FSB) command assistant S3 and S5- conducted daily meetings with NGOs at Carnis to discuss log and security concerns. The TF assisted the NGOs with their relief efforts in several important, 25th ID (L) elements provided route security and protection to "Fofo" convoys as they delivered much-needed supplies to the villages. Company B, 65th conducted security patrols to protect a Cortinian refugee camp and improved the inside the compound by constructing field latrines and a shower point. Food, water supplies provided by the 225th FSB sustained the displaced persons within the camp support reached them.

swa.html at www-cgsc.army.mil Page 7 of 9

<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html> 3/6/98

In addition to HA, the TF also employed a positive informational campaign to gain for its actions and reinforce the UN mandate's legality. Both the media and psychological operations (PSYOP) detachment proved useful in influencing belligerent inhabitants' behavior. The TF welcomed the media and provided them with open access at command levels. Command members answered reporters' questions to the best of their ability and generally avoided speculation about areas outside their responsibility. Reporter tactical and HA successes, as well as mistakes in judgment that resulted in friendly fire, working with, rather than against, the media added to the TF's credibility, resulting in more objective tactical situation portrayals. In real-world interventions, positive media support for PE operations.

PSYOP worked in tandem with news media broadcasts to marshal popular support while pressuring the belligerents to come to an agreement. Employing both propaganda and psychological activities to the TF's advantage, the 24th PSYOP Detachment targeted their main effort. The PSYOP teams helped convince the villagers that US troops were peacemakers, not foreign conquerors- a very important distinction in gaining public support. The detachment also worked hard to undermine, confuse and demoralize hostile forces. Acadians refused to leave the buffer zone, an overt propaganda campaign succeeded as obstructionists to the peace process, which allowed stronger measures to be enforced. Thus, well-integrated PA and PSYOPS campaigns can assist peace enforcers in gaining acceptance and moral authority while denying the same to hostile parties.

PE Insights

Military PE missions are extremely demanding. Peace enforcers must enter into dangerous environments where they are subject to the intense scrutiny of international public enemy bullets. Every soldier's actions, good or bad, carry significant political consequences. PE depends on several variables. Acting under a UN mandate's broad political guidance, commanders must develop plans with measurable military objectives that focus on the belligerents' COG. PE also has physical and moral dimensions. Once the belligerents separated and the buffer zone established, peace enforcers earn further moral support by aiding NGOs with HA. Military forces can help win the local populace's support by aiding their own nation's public will by integrating a positive PA-media campaign into their operations. The complexities of a PE environment require versatile combat forces led by military wide-ranging intellectual flexibility.

TF

Warrior's

experiences at the soldier, leader and unit levels highlighted several relevant lessons for future Army PE missions. Hallmarks of today's Army, soldier discipline and skill ingredients in both wartime and peace operations. Leaders- at all levels- must demonstrate awareness and sensitivity to the relationship between national policies and tactical operations. Negotiation skills, knowledge of foreign cultures and ability to relate to NGOs

Institutional schooling and self- study represent the mandatory first steps in t Unit training and professional assignments will then provide practical experienc development. Units assigned PE duties must focus some of their collective traini tasks, such as setting up roadblocks and checkpoints, patrolling in urban areas refugees. Most of these tasks can be superimposed over existing drills, tactics, procedures and METL tasks. Others will require ad hoc responses and ingenuity. The Army's participation in peace operations and operations other than war will

swa. html at www- cgsc. army. mil Page 8 of 9

[http:// www- cgsc. army. mil/ milrev/ milrvweb/ nov/ swa. html](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html) 3/ 6/ 98

the short term. While maintaining primary focus on warfighting capabilities, bri PE duties must make certain intellectual adjustments to adapt to this convoluted environment. The realistic conditions posed by JRTC Rotation 9- 94 provided TF W with the mental preparation and practical experience necessary to perform future 1. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], July 1994). Anthony Lake, " The Limits of The New York Times (6 February 1994), B- 1, also discusses the US policies and operations.

2. US Army Field Manual (FM) 100- 5, Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, June 199 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Operations Other than War, Volume IV, Peace Ope Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 1- 2.

3. FM 7- 98, Operations in a Low- Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: GPO, 19 O 100- 20, Military Operations in a Low- Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: GPO, Commandant, US Army Infantry School (USAIS), White Paper: The Application of Pe Enforcement [PE] at Brigade and Battalion (Fort Benning, GA: GPO, 31 August 19 techniques, tactics and procedures packets provided by USAIS mobile training tea

4. For examples of the task force's (TF's) PE lane training see Donna Miles, " Peace," Soldiers

(October 1994), 37- 39.

5. According to Carl von Clausewitz, the center of gravity (COG) is " the hub o movement on which everything depends" and that " point against which all our ene directed." A COG, therefore, represents a belligerent's principal source of stre freedom of action, fighting power and will. Correct COG identification is import operations because " only by constantly seeking out the center of [a belligeren to win all, will one really defeat the enemy." For further discussion, see Carl War, Peter Paret and Michael Howard; eds. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 596- 97, and FM 100- 5, 6- 7.

6. FM 100- 5 defines

decisive points

as " a point, usually geographical in nature, that, when retained, provides a commander with a marked advantage over his opponent. Decisive points include other physical elements such as enemy formations, command post and commu nodes. Glossary- 2.

7. A fundamental assumption of peace operations is that the belligerents will ho commitments. However, commanders must be prepared to protect their forces during scenario. In retrospect, especially in light of the Rangers' encirclement battle prudence dictates that TF elements should be familiar with and practice breakout during their train- up periods.

8. Deterrence involves the prevention from action by fear of consequence. Largel opponent's psychological state of mind, deterrence involves a threat backed by c the willpower to carry out the threat's sanctions.

9. Propaganda involves the " selling" of ideas, information or rumors through a communication methods to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviors o to conform to US interests. Besides media manipulation, direct psychological ope such as military alerts, troop movements, rallies, medical and agricultural prog

prestige while increasing that of US forces. See 25th Infantry Division (Light) Psychological Operations Handbook (3 May 1993), 2- 3. For excellent scholarly d PSYOP's usefulness as a tool in military operations, coercive diplomacy, limited political warfare, see Carnes Lord and Frank B. Barnett, eds., Political Warfare Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 45- 66, 7

swa. html at www- cgsc. army. mil Page 9 of 9

[http:// www- cgsc. army. mil/ milrev/ milrvweb/ nov/ swa. html](http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/milrvweb/nov/swa.html) 3/ 6/ 98

Colonel Charles H. Swannack Jr. is assistant division commander for Operations, Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B. S. from the United States (USMA) and an M. S. from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is a graduate College and the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He has served of command and staff positions in the Continental United States (CONUS), Hawaii Caribbean, to include chief of staff, 25th Infantry Division (Light) (ID [L]) Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; commander 2d Brigade, 25th ID (L), Schofield Barrac politico- military planner and chief, Caribbean Basin Branch, Western Hemisphere Joint Staff, Washington, D. C.; and commander, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regime Division, Fort Ord, California.

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Gray is operations officer, Joint Operations, CENTCO Joint Staff, Washington, D. C. He received a B. A. from Western Illinois Univers Ph. D. from Ohio State University. He is a graduate of CGSC. He has served in a command and staff positions in CONUS and Hawaii, to include brigade S3, 2d Briga Schofield Barracks; G3 Training, 25th ID (L), Schofield Barracks; and assistant Department of History, USMA, West Point, New York.

Control Fields

document_version_identifier: .00
doc_security_classification: U
document_restriction: 999
 file_room: MILITARY REVIEW ENGLISH EDITION
 file_cabinet: 1990-1999
 file_drawer: 1997
 file_folder: VOL LXXVII, NO. 6 - NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1997 - PEACEKEEPI
 subject: 04, PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
document_creation_date: 19971101
author_or_originator: SWANNACK, CHARLES H. JRCOL; GRAY, DAVID R. LTC
 document_type: PERIODICALS
originating_organization: CGSC
 total_pages: 9
 file_code_original: AR 25-30ss
historically_significant: Y
 media_type: ELECTRONIC
 record_format: PDF
 vital_record_code: N
 file_code_current: 870-5d
 acquired_from: CGSC FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSAS