

# Peace-Enforcement Operations

by Capt Kenneth Rapuano, USMCR

*Peace-enforcement operations require a new way of thinking and planning. This author offers some suggestions.*

Since the end of World War II, the United Nations has conducted 26 peacekeeping operations. The great majority of these efforts have been straightforward attempts to maintain peace by providing a buffer between parties willing to cease hostilities, yet lacking trust in one another. This type of operation is clearly distinguishable from humanitarian support efforts undertaken to respond to natural disasters and is clearly different from the application of military force in response to aggression or as a means of ceasing hostilities between warring parties, i.e., peace enforcement.\* However, in recent years, the international community has become more inclined to respond to situations in which the distinctions between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations are no longer clearly identifiable.

In the political and social turmoil resulting from the end of the Cold War, the emergence of critical humanitarian emergencies, created by human conflict and worsened by natural disasters, will tax the institutional capacity of the international community to respond. Furthermore, the nature of these exigencies will likely involve high risks for those seeking to provide assistance to the victims and at the same time cease hostilities and adjudicate disputes between warring parties. Accordingly, as the risks and costs of this type of humanitarian intervention grow, the international community and U.N. agencies will increasingly look to the United States for the leadership and military resources necessary to meet these new needs.

The areas that are most likely to see instability and conflict leading to potential U.S. involvement are generally

located far from traditional superpower confrontation planning. Likewise, the addition of the humanitarian mission to limited objective military operations—already constrained by peace-enforcement objectives—severely complicates the task of military commanders. This means that the uncertainty level for most Marine air-ground task force operations responding to instability is likely to be higher than in previous conflicts. It is therefore critical that Marine planners are cognizant of the different missions and requirements of the peacemaking and humanitarian efforts of the past, and the significantly more ambiguous and dangerous mission of peace enforcement.

## Peacekeeping vs. Peace-Enforcement Operations

Peacekeeping, as the name implies, involves the maintenance of the condition of peace, or perhaps more appropriately, cessation of hostilities. Peacekeeping by necessity relies on the consent of the parties of the conflict and their readiness to cooperate with the peacekeepers. Typically, peacekeeping forces are deployed to a country or region as part of an agreed political solution to a dispute. Unless all the warring parties recognize that their disputes cannot be favorably resolved by conflict, peacekeeping efforts cannot succeed. Consequently, peacekeepers have traditionally performed tasks such as monitoring cease-fires, controlling buffer zones, verifying demobilization agreements, and monitoring elections. Peacekeepers are usually lightly armed and use their weapons only in self-defense. Critical to the success of any peacekeeping operation is the unquestioned impartiality of the peacekeepers.

Peace enforcement, on the other hand, involves the attempt to enforce the cessation of ongoing hostilities. This endeavor, by its nature, is undertaken without the consent of at least one of the warring parties and there-

fore is a considerably more ambitious and dangerous undertaking than peacekeeping. Peace-enforcement operations can be expected to require commitment of heavily armed forces and involve extensive humanitarian support missions. The maintenance of impartiality in such operations can be expected to be very difficult or impossible, and peace-enforcement forces must be prepared for the contingency of hostile engagement with all the warring parties of the conflict.

In addition to the initial objective of halting hostilities, peace enforcement involves the effort to broker a peaceful settlement of the dispute between the parties. If military forces are withdrawn without effecting a political solution, chaos will return. In the final analysis, the fundamental purpose of applying military force in peace-enforcement operations is to preserve, restore, or create an environment of order and stability within which a government can function effectively under a code of laws.

## Past Peace-Enforcement Operations

Although there has been much recent discussion regarding the future potential for U.N. peace-enforcement operations—most significantly by the U.N. Secretary General—these are relatively uncharted waters. There are few historical precedents for the use of military intervention to separate combatants by force in conjunction with diplomatic efforts to broker an end to disputes, and these offer an unencouraging record of success. The common cause of the problems incurred in these operations is the ultimate forfeiture of neutral third party status by the forces attempting to force peace between warring parties.

*Congo:* In July 1960, the U.N. Security Council voted to send a U.N. force to the Congo to restore order to the war torn former Belgian colony. Initially, the role of the U.N. troops was to assist the Congolese Government in

\*Although "peace enforcement" has apparently become the term used to define military intervention to separate combatants by force, this is somewhat of a misnomer in that it incorrectly implies a condition of peace is pre-existing. Accordingly, "peacemaking" would be a more applicable term.

maintaining law and order. They were lightly armed and their rules of engagement were to fire only in self-defense. Within 2 months of the arrival of U.N. troops in September 1960, the Congo Government dissolved and four opposing camps, each with its own armed forces, claimed control over all or part of the country. On 21 February 1961, in response to this deteriorating situation, the Security Council supported a resolution authorizing U.N. peacekeepers to use force, if necessary, to prevent civil war in the Congo. The council had never granted such authority before, and has not done so since.

This expanded U.N. role in the conflict transcended the traditional concept of peacekeeping and became peace enforcement. In doing so, any hopes of maintaining a neutral role in the conflict were nullified and, at one time or another, each side felt that the United Nations was working against it. This caused a series of attacks by various Congolese factions on U.N. troops. In the end, 234 U.N. troops were killed, and the organization spent over \$1.8 billion (1991 dollars). Two and a half years after independence and U.N. intervention, the secession attempt was over. The U.N. force withdrew from the Congo on 30 June 1964, almost 4 years after its arrival.

At the time of the U.N. contingent's departure, the Congo was hardly an ordered society, but it was clear that there was little left for the United Nations to do. Towards the end of U.N. military involvement in the Congo, it had become clear that efforts to resolve a conflict in which the parties were unable or unwilling to settle differences, was a costly and fruitless proposition. "The U.N. cannot permanently protect the Congo, or any other country," U.N. Secretary General U Thant said, "from the internal tensions and disturbances created by its own organic growth toward unity and nationhood." In 1965, shortly after U.N. peacekeeping troops left the Congo, Joseph Mobutu staged a coup and eventually succeeded in uniting the Congo—since 1971, the Republic of Zaire—and, while doing so, fashioned one of the most tyrannical and corrupt regimes in Africa.

*Beirut:* At the behest of the Lebanese Government, the Multinational Force (MNF) was deployed in Beirut for the

second time in 1982 with over twice the manpower of the first peacekeeping force sent to monitor the withdrawal of Palestine Liberation Organization fighters. It was designated MNF II and initially given the mandate to serve as an "interpositional force," separating Israeli Defense Force (IDF) from the Lebanese population. The force was composed of forces from the United States, France, Italy, and Britain. Each contingent retained its own chain of command, and no central command structure was created. The stated mission of the U.S. Marine element was to establish an environment that would permit the Lebanese Army to carry out its responsibilities in the Beirut area. Tactically, the Marines were charged with occupying security positions along a line from the airport east of the Presidential Palace at Babda. The intent was to separate the IDF from the population of Beirut.


The key to the initial success of MNF II was its neutrality. The Lebanese Government obtained commitments from various factions to refrain from hostilities against the Marines. Subsequent Marine actions to halt Israeli advances and conduct relief operations in the mountains greatly enhanced the United States' reputation as a protector of the Lebanese people. By mid-1982 the tentative alliance of Lebanon's rival factions had unraveled and terrorist activities resumed. Despite this, the United States persevered in its efforts to broker an Israeli-Lebanese treaty, and on 17 May both parties agreed to abolish the state of war between them and negotiate secu-

rity arrangements allowing for an Israeli withdrawal. The Syrians vehemently opposed the agreement and in response formed the National Salvation Front comprising many of the sects controlling Lebanon's territory.

Up until this point, the MNF had been perceived by the Muslims in West Beirut as a protector. With the Israeli withdrawal, the MNF came to be regarded as a protagonist in the unfinished civil war that propped up the Jumayyil government. In August and the ensuing months, the Marines came under almost daily attack from artillery, mortar, rocket, and small arms fire. The U.S. force was clearly seen by the warring parties as having inherited Israel's role of shoring up the precarious Lebanese government, and became a participant in the conflict rather than a neutral party. In April 1983, a suicide bomber struck the U.S. Embassy killing 63 people, including 17 Americans. On 23 October 1983, Shiite terrorists struck the Marine battalion landing team headquarters and the French MNF headquarters in simultaneous suicide bombing attacks.

Although the MNF remained in Lebanon after the October bombings, the situation of the U.S. and French contingents was precarious. The disintegration of the Lebanese Army in the 1983-1984 battles in the Shuf Mountains and their eviction from West Beirut by militia forces precipitated the final withdrawal of the MNF in February 1984.

It is apparent that past attempts at peace enforcement have met with less than total success. If the United States



*A Marine machinegunner keeps watch in Beirut in 1983.*

is to do t  
train for  
tions. The  
basic oper  
keeping at  
ations. Th  
peace-enc  
trated by t  
erational p  
tical to th  
others are

#### Peacekeepi

- Local  
tions tha  
are credi  
requisite  
ment of p
- Manda  
must be  
clearly u
- Peacek  
possible,  
sustain a
- Contin  
communi  
and mair  
authoritie
- ly bellige
- Observ  
ing force  
should be
- Forces  
sions shou  
engaged i  
tions in tl
- Commu  
ications s

g for an Is-  
rians vehe-  
ment and in  
ional Salva-  
nany of the  
s territory.  
e MNF had  
Muslims in  
With the Is-  
F came to be  
in the unfin-  
pped up the  
August and  
Marines came  
k from artil-  
small arms  
early seen by  
in inherited  
the precari-  
nt, and be-  
conflict rath-  
April 1983, a  
ne U.S. Em-  
including 17  
r 1983, Shiite  
ine battalion  
ers and the  
ers in simul-  
attacks.  
remained in  
er bombings,  
and French  
is. The disin-  
Army in the  
uf Mountains  
est Beirut by  
the final with-  
bruary 1984.

t attempts at  
met with less  
United States



ette \* October 1993

is to do better in the future it must train for peace-enforcement operations. The following provides some basic operational principles for peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. The added complexity of the peace-enforcement mission is illustrated by the fact that several of its operational principles are virtually identical to those of peacekeeping, while others are diametrically opposite.

## Peacekeeping

- Local and international perceptions that the peacekeeping forces are credible and impartial is a prerequisite for successful accomplishment of peacekeeping missions.
- Mandate of peacekeeping forces must be widely publicized so it is clearly understood by all parties.
- Peacekeeping forces, to the extent possible, must have the capability to sustain and defend themselves.
- Continuous, multilevel, multiparty communications must be established and maintained with residents, local authorities, police, and all potentially belligerent units.
- Observation posts and peacekeeping force positions, when possible, should be mutually supporting.
- Forces assigned peacekeeping missions should not have previously been engaged in peace-enforcement operations in the same contingency.
- Command, control, and communications should emphasize openness

and consistency in order to build confidence of all parties in the impartiality of peacekeepers.


- Centralized structure for command, control, and communications of multinational contingents is essential for unified and coordinated operations.
- Tactical mobility of peacekeeping forces must, at a minimum, be equal to that of other armed parties in the area of operations.
- An active and sophisticated civil affairs/psychological operations effort to enhance the credibility of peacekeeping forces in the eye of residents and potentially belligerent factions, should be attempted.
- Management of media message is vital to ensuring the credibility and impartiality of peacekeeping forces is enhanced rather than undermined.

## Peace Enforcement

- Peace-enforcement operations must be undertaken with the understanding that in the long term, the only effective way of resolving hostilities is to address the conditions that cause the conflict. Political level development of policies that give greater priority to political and economic reform in the affected area should be coordinated with peace-enforcement force commanders.
- Effective interposition operations between warring parties without their consent will require overwhelming show of force by peace enforcers in

order to deter potential hostilities by one or more belligerents.

- As with peacekeeping operations, mandate of peace-enforcement mission should be widely publicized so it is clearly understood by all parties.
  - U.S. forces must be prepared to be committed to combat under a non-U.S. commander; traditional chain of command will not be applicable to U.S. forces seconded to U.N. command.
  - Forces assigned a peace-enforcement mission should not have previously been engaged in peacekeeping operations in the same contingency.
  - Peace-enforcement operations should be undertaken with the expectation that forces may be employed as combatants against one or more of the warring parties.
  - Particular emphasis should be placed on crowd control/riot control and urban operations—the line between policing and combatant operations is likely to be ill defined.
  - Command, control, and communications should emphasize strict operational security.
  - Centralized structure for command, control, and communications of multinational contingents is essential for unified and coordinated operations.
  - Emphasis should be placed on the use of civil affairs/psychological operations assets to win the confidence of the civilian population and deter potential belligerents.
  - Active public affairs effort should be made to manage the media message. Emphasis should be placed on controlling the media's access to and movement between various factions in conflict.
  - Transition between peace-enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations must be well coordinated and publicized.
  - Peace-enforcement and peacekeeping missions should be clearly distinguished from one another—forces engaged in peace-enforcement missions should not subsequently be assigned to peacekeeping operations.
- In a number of areas, the requirements for the preparation for and conduct of humanitarian/peace-enforcement operations may be different than standard military operations.
- The international nature of situations for humanitarian/peace-enforcement operations makes it likely that



*In future humanitarian operations Marines will probably have to work with other forces of varying ability and training.*

Marine Corps Gazette \* October 1993



such efforts will be conducted by a coalition of nations, either under the authority of the United Nations or working together under some other aegis. While a widely based international effort is highly desirable from a diplomatic and political standpoint, it can significantly complicate the task of U.S. forces deployed to such contingencies. Marine units deployed on such missions must be prepared to work in concert with forces with widely varying levels of training, different modes of operation, and incompatible communications gear and other equipment.

Preparation for Marine involvement in such operations will necessitate participation in multinational planning and training extending beyond current joint training conducted with traditional U.S. friends and allies. Effective conduct of such missions will require coordinated command and control, interoperability of both equipment and communications, and close planning and training between states. In addition, the nature of these operations places a higher emphasis on training for limited objective or nonviolent operations in politically sensitive situations than is traditionally provided to Marine combat arms units.

Contingencies requiring humanitarian/peace-enforcement involvement are likely to take place in areas with damaged infrastructure. At a minimum, relief forces must be prepared to improve the existing infrastructure in order to support their own operations. The expeditionary nature of Marine forces makes them particularly well suited for this type environment. However, the addition of less prepared forces to an international contingent, as well as the needs of victimized populations, could significantly increase the re-

quirement for infrastructure related capabilities such as electrical power generation, land-line communications, military police, explosive ordnance disposal, mortuary services, and water purification.

Based on the extremely diverse nature of humanitarian/peace-enforcement contingencies, detailed advanced contingency planning for such operations is difficult. Some or all of the following key mission elements will be applicable to such operations: secure major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points; neutralize/disarm hostile combatants; monitor and/or enforce truces between warring parties; provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations; assist U.N./nongovernmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief; and provide logistical, security, and other assistance to international/State Department relief personnel dealing with the conflict's political, economic, and social dimensions.

Marine forces would receive intelligence support for potential humanitarian/peace-enforcement operations in the same manner in which other intelligence support is provided—by intelligence section liaison and coordination with the next level in the operational chain of command. However, due to the fact that many areas that are likely to see instability leading to humanitarian/peacekeeping operations are far from traditional conflict planning areas, there are presently intelligence shortfalls in certain areas. Many areas in which greater commitment is probable are covered by inaccurate, out-of-date, or nonexistent maps and charts. Also a database should be constructed with key information on countries in

which intervention is likely. It should include information on internal lines of communication; communication paths, networks, and nodes; ports; and operational geography (beaches, coastline, river networks, expeditionary airfields).

The future of humanitarian/peace-enforcement operations, to a good degree, will be based on the success or failure of currently ongoing operations in Yugoslavia and Somalia. If these operations are concluded successfully with minimal loss of life, it can be expected that similar missions will be attempted in the future. However, if, as is more likely, the short term results of these missions are mixed and the long-term prospects grim or uncertain, the international community will be inclined to be more cautious and consider future interventions on a case-by-case basis using a more conservatively weighted cost/benefit analysis.

This caution notwithstanding, the current trend is clearly moving toward increased multinational intervention to halt hostilities and provide assistance to victimized populations. This development has significant implications for Marine expeditionary forces. Moreover, in many of these situations, the combination of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peace-enforcement requirements is created or exacerbated by unresolvable ethnic and/or religious hatreds.

If the United States elects to contribute forces to these international efforts, the Marine Corps is uniquely suited to fulfill this role. It is therefore critical that Marine Corps planners and commanders are aware of the unique characteristics and requirements of such operations. It is important to keep in mind that the peace-enforcement mission remains politically ill defined and combines some or all of the planning and operational requirements of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and combat operations into one. This composite mission is challenging to prepare for and even more difficult to prosecute successfully. The objectives must be limited, achievable, and clearly understood by all participants if success is to be achieved.



>Capt Rapuano is currently a senior analyst with Meridian Corp., a defense consulting company based in Alexandria, VA.

Marine Corps Gazette • October 1993

In a pe  
turmoil,  
creasingly  
world's po  
desired t  
having el  
mestic ag  
may, Am  
the world  
means, if  
and chan  
ception e  
of nation:  
de facto n

What d  
can milita  
abroad ar  
How will  
ment sho  
he is ge  
What are  
ensure he  
sion is cc  
Who do t  
who is a b  
iticians w  
capital?

The int  
the dich  
rules of er  
keeping o  
are gener  
er in the i  
for peace.  
discretion  
vice those

The law  
nated with  
to an activ  
also seeks  
devastatin  
for nonco  
conflict st  
of norma  
herently d

Throug  
to reduce  
bringing to

Marine Corps