

# From DESERT STORM To RESTORE HOPE: The Maturing of Marine Civil Affairs

*When planning for an exercise or a real-world situation, all too often the significance of dealing with the local civilian population—its culture, ideology, and traditions—is overlooked. The author here addresses the importance of using the Corps' civil affairs expertise in such matters.*

by Capt Judith A. Orr, USMCR

In August 1990 it appeared to much of the world that, after invading Kuwait, Iraqi forces would not be content to stop at the Saudi border. By the middle of August, the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Program was proving its worth. 1st and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) deployed quickly, married up with their equipment, and established a credible defense. The arrival of the Marines and the Ready Brigade of the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps raised the stakes and limited the Iraqis' strategic options. A move against Saudi Arabia would now be viewed as a move against the United States. Marines again answered the call in December 1992 when the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (15th MEU) made a traditional amphibious landing on the shores of Mogadishu, Somalia, to provide security for a failing relief operation.

Maritime forces—regardless of whether or not they are traditionally deployed using amphibious ships and landing craft or are airlifted to link with assigned MPF shipping—provide the speed, flexibility, and firepower needed to meet a variety of missions from combat to humanitarian relief. Unlike airlifted "quick response" forces, Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) arrive with a robust logistics capability. A MAGTF can remain on station for extended periods of time, making its presence felt without being committed. The MAGTF, a modern form of "gunboat diplomacy," is ideally suited for show-of-force operations. In addition, MAGTFs are well-suited to serve as a floating logistics base in support of low-intensity conflict (LIC) or humanitarian relief operations because they are initially self-sustaining and have a small logistics footprint. A rapidly changing world and a shrinking defense budget provide ample jus-

tification for flexible, deployable forces. The availability of modern weapons to even the poorest of developing nations means that firepower can't be sacrificed for speed. For these reasons, the Navy is placing a greater emphasis on warfare being fought "from the sea" instead of "on the sea." In addition to becoming a cornerstone of Navy-Marine Corps policy, maritime and littoral operations may become the cornerstone of national policy as well.

## Civil Affairs

The 1990s may be a busy time for the Marine Corps in general and Marine civil affairs in particular. The most likely missions facing the Marine Corps—show-of-force, relief, and LIC operations—are all civil affairs intensive. Civil affairs comes into play any time military operations—directly or indirectly affect the civilian population and any time civilian actions directly or indirectly affect military operations. The civil affairs mission is not only to minimize any adverse effects the civilian population may have on the unit's mission but also to ensure that military operations do not adversely affect the civilian population when it can be avoided. Civil-affairs-related activities may include anything from planning civic action programs for winning "hearts and minds," coordinating with local officials, or coordinating relief operations with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) like the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies. Even DESERT SHIELD served as a reminder that MPF operations require more than detailed logistical planning—they also require civil affairs support.

In both peacetime and combat, the role that civil affairs plays in accomplishing the mission is

## Tactical Civil Affairs Planning: One Perspective for the "Three"

by Capt Darren Pitts,  
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The Marine Corps' Operation PINNACLE ADVANCE, conducted in four phases aboard the Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, CA was the largest peacetime joint training exercise in the Marine Corps Reserves' 78-year history. The operation integrated approximately 16,000 Marines in addition to elements of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force.

Planning for PINNACLE ADVANCE focused on forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. Like others in recent history, the operational environment reflected potential real-world contingencies. PINNACLE ADVANCE's scenario in-

corporated the offensive characteristics of Operation DESERT STORM and the humanitarian dimensions of Operation RESTORE HOPE. The ambitious scenario was more than adequate to drive the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) warfighting planning. But, given the increasing prospect of U.S. involvement with U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and operations other than war, the MAGTF should take more active steps to address the civilian dimension of future warfare.

In part, the exercise scenario reads:

Mojavia presently occupies and controls territory that Samaran government, civic, and religious leaders have historically considered their own. In a move to reestablish occupation and control of this disputed territory, Samara expelled all Mojavian expatriates from within its borders. Samara used this mass exodus of nearly 2 million

Mojavians to disrupt the country's fragile infrastructure with social disorder and widespread famine.

Training for real-world missions that involve MAGTF interaction with civilians demands expertise resident only in the Corps' two Reserve civil affairs groups (CAGs).

The planning for such complex operations extends beyond traditional warfighting tasks (offensive, defensive, etc.). The presence of 2 million displaced (and potentially angry) refugees would stifle a MAGTF, a coalition, or joint task force of any size. It is critical for those in the S-3/G-3 community to recognize that the Marine Reserve Forces (MarResFor) staff planned PINNACLE ADVANCE without a civil affairs officer on the staff. This resulted in the omission of Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the operation order. Although the table of organization for MAGTF-I called for a 3d CAG detachment, no civil affairs representatives were ob-

often grossly misunderstood—a misunderstanding that can often have serious consequences. After DESERT STORM, an Army unit posted alongside the Iraq-Kuwait border quickly became overwhelmed with refugees who were escaping the Iraqis' attacks against the Shiite Muslims. Although it is a well-established principle of international law that an occupying military force is responsible for assisting all refugees within their occupied zone and providing for their basic welfare, valuable days were lost while the military and relief organizations argued over who was responsible for the refugees. A quote from one senior officer who was present best illustrates how poorly civil affairs and civil-military relationships and responsibilities are understood: "I am a military man. We are not in the business of massive humanitarian relief." Yet, in this case, they were. Although this incident involved the Army, there are similar misunderstandings within the Marine Corps.

As a civil affairs officer, one quickly tires of explaining the difference between civil and public affairs or trying to dispel the notion that civil affairs is limited to processing civilian claims against the government. A unit is not freed from its responsibilities just because a civil affairs officer wasn't assigned, no more than a commander is freed from the responsibility to supply his/her Marines

because the unit lacks a logistics officer. *FMFM 7-34, MAGTF Civil Affairs*, makes it clear that civil affairs is the responsibility of the MAGTF commander.

If the case of the Iraqi refugees fleeing into Safwan, Iraq, demonstrates one extreme along the spectrum of civil affairs-related missions, then the early stages of DESERT SHIELD demonstrates another extreme. Even the success of an MPF operation depends upon continued access to the ports and airfields provided by the host nation. In the future, the local government may find itself facing a situation similar to what the Saudi Government faced in the early stages of DESERT SHIELD when it found itself caught between an imminent military threat and domestic political fears concerning foreign—especially American—military involvement. Next time, success may depend upon how well we can execute a well-thought-out civil affairs program. An effective program needs to be fully integrated with the ongoing military operation in order to strike the needed balance between the operational needs of the Marine Corps and the desires and political needs of the host nation.

Many civil affairs "firsts" came about as a result of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Both the 3d and 4th Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs), 4th Marine Division, were activated and deployed to Southwest Asia (SWA). This activation not only represented

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tained to augment the MarResFor or MAGTF staff during the planning phase and before special outside forces arrived to perform these functions.

This oversight meant that local inhabitants of the host nation were effectively ignored. The MarResFor G-3 didn't plan for the refugee "problem," didn't make crucial liaison with the U.S. country team or local government officials, couldn't acquire human intelligence about enemy operations within its zone, and had no idea what civilian resources or assets the MAGTF could use to accomplish its mission. For operational and training purposes, each CAG has school-trained officers capable of planning joint psychological operations.

Another issue that surfaced during the first phase of PIN-

NACLE ADVANCE was determining where to place civil affairs representatives on the MAGTF staff. The G-5 (future operations) section is where they were eventually misplaced. According to Marine Corps doctrine, civil affairs is a command responsibility that falls under G-3 (operations). Military missions that encompass large-scale, humanitarian projects require the inclusion of CAG officers during the critical planning process, not as an afterthought.

The MarResFor (G-2) requested assistance from the 4th CAG, but only for use as "role players." The only role Marine Corps civil affairs should play is that of advising the MAGTF commander on matters that reduce civilian interference with his mission, which in turn provides his gunfighters

access to critical resources of the host nation.

Peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, stability operations, and humanitarian intervention have quickly become a viable political alternative to war. Future MAGTF and joint task force commanders and staff might consider two key questions:

(1) What impact will civilians, displaced persons and/or refugees have on our mission?

(2) Has the "Three" requested civil affairs assistance and expertise from the CAG?



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100 percent of the civil affairs assets available to the Marine Corps, but also marked the first large-scale use of civil affairs units by the Marine Corps since the CAGs evolved from experience in the Vietnam War. The unique nature of civil affairs caused confusion and frustration among some staff sections.

Among active duty Marines, civil affairs' visibility has improved in the last few years, due in part to the extensive noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) training received by the special operations capable Marine expeditionary units (MEU(SOC)s). However, keeping the CAGs in the Reserve limits their interaction with the active duty units they support. In addition, years of peacetime exercises, which usually provided little realistic civil affairs play, caused many to view civil affairs as little more than damage control and claims management.

The tendency of civil affairs operations to crossover into what some staff officers perceive as their traditional turf adds to the confusion and misunderstanding. For example, assistance may be needed from the G-1/S-1 for processing refugees or evacuees, from the G-2/S-2 to assist with area studies and gather civil affairs related information, and from the G-4/S-4 to coordinate disaster relief. Instead of feeling that civil affairs personnel are invading their turf, staff officers can learn to use civil affairs personnel to their advantage. If civil affairs teams are actively assessing the region and have access to the staff sections, they can provide both the G/S-2 and G/S-4 with invaluable information.

Commanding officers and staff officers need to

realize that civil affairs is a vital part of their mission, but we also need to make civil affairs doctrine reflect the current needs of the Marine Corps, not the past needs of the Army. In the past, the Marine Corps based much of its civil affairs doctrine on the Army's civil-military operations (CMO) doctrine—doctrine developed from the experiences of Allied occupation forces after World War II. Many CMO functional areas, such as rationing, price controls, and public education, would be needed only if U.S. forces were responsible for the long-term governing of a populated area. Given the negative connotation associated with the concept of military occupation, especially U.S. military occupation, and the increased use of multinational or United Nations forces, it is very unlikely that Marines will act as a unilateral occupying force.

The Marine Corps has made a step in the right direction by publishing *FMFM 7-34*, which replaces the Army's 20 functional areas (see Table 1) with 6 (see Table 2) and changes the focus from nation building to operational support. Although the manual provides a strong foundation, it is long on definitions and preformatted messages and short on what civil affairs actually entails. What does an area study/assessment do? What should it contain? Why is it important to maintain host-nation relations, and how can Marines coordinate

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with their civilian counterparts? How can civil affairs help in resource procurement and lessen the burden on our supply lines? How can civil affairs provide support operations?

#### Area Assessments

Sometimes, as was experienced in Indochina, difficulties arise determining just where military operations cease and civil operations begin. Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, and PROVIDE COMFORT have shown how civilians can adversely impact military operations and have highlighted the danger inherent in divorcing civil affairs planning from operational planning. Then there is the case of Operation RESTORE HOPE which was a civil affairs operation from its inception. Unfortunately, all too often civil affairs planning is done in a vacuum. Civil affairs planning, like operational planning, hinges on valid information and a realistic appraisal of available re-

sources, in other words, an area study.

Strangely enough, the restrictive liberty policy (i.e., none) in the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) area of responsibility invoked during DESERT SHIELD provides a good example of how assessments can be utilized. While Marines often criticized it, the "no liberty" policy made sense from both a military and civil affairs standpoint. It not only improved physical security, operational security, personnel accountability, and unit cohesion, but probably helped lessen any concerns the Saudis might have had. It was apparent that Al Jubayl, the industrial port where a vast majority of Marines spent at least part of their deployment, could not match Riyadh or Dhahran (liberty was allowed in both cities) in terms of size, or population. Jubayl's small population and limited facilities could not have handled large numbers of Marines on liberty without significantly affecting the local population.

Caught off guard by the Iraqi invasion, we had little information about the culture, politics, and history of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq and what we had was gained through publications and knowledgeable people who had traveled to the areas in question. This information was used to develop a cultural awareness program that was aimed at minimizing the potential for incidents between Marines and the Saudis—by demonstrating to the Saudis a willingness to learn about their culture and religion.

Unfortunately, much of this information was outdated, not detailed enough, or learned "on-the-job." By the time Operation RESTORE HOPE came along we may not have had the detailed information, but we at least knew what questions to ask. By looking at past relief operations, looking at what the NGOs and relief organizations already working in Somalia were doing, and applying common sense, a sound plan that emphasized reestablishing security first and moving quickly toward providing security of relief convoys into the countryside was developed. This probably prevented even more Somalis from taking to the roads in search of food.

In order to support future operations, general overviews must be supplemented by specific information about the regions Marine forces will be operating in. For example, MPF operations require detailed information about the areas and cities surrounding proposed airfields and ports. To get a feel for what type of information is needed and what questions to ask, one can turn to *Civil Affairs Basic Intelligence Requirement (CABIR)*. The CABIR covers just about everything that a Marine unit might need to know about a region or country. The assessment should cover, at a minimum, local government agencies and officials, the makeup of the population and their views towards Americans and/or Marines, and the location of key facilities such as schools, hospitals, and police and fire stations. In addition, businesses involved in key industries (food distribution, transportation, construction, and utilities) need to be identified.

#### Civil Affairs Functional Areas— U.S. Army

1. Civil Defense
2. Labor
3. Legal
4. Public Administration
5. Public Education
6. Public Finance
7. Public Health
8. Public Safety
9. Public Welfare
10. Civilian Supply
11. Economics and Commerce
12. Food and Agriculture
13. Property Control
14. Public Communications
15. Transportation
16. Public Works and Utilities
17. Arts, Monuments, and Archives
18. Civil Information
19. Cultural Affairs
20. Dislocated Civilians

(Source: *FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations*)

Table 1

#### Civil Affairs Functional Areas— U.S. Marine Corps

1. Public Health
2. Legal and Public Safety
3. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
4. Disaster Relief
5. Civilian Containment and Control
6. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

(Source: *FMFM 7-34, MAGTF Civil Affairs*)

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Business customs that differ from those of the United States should be noted. Detailed maps, ideally those used by local government agencies for planning and/or emergency services, need to be obtained.

For a variety of internal and external reasons, most published area studies are outdated and too general to prove useful. In a stable situation, it's either feast or famine—too much information to process or too little to be of much use. When the situation changes as rapidly as it did in postinvasion Kuwait, the difficulties are multiplied. By their very nature, combat and disaster operations mean that the water source you picked out during your area assessment yesterday may be gone tomorrow.

Since we never know where the next conflict will occur or where the next natural disaster will strike, these difficulties could simply be written off as unsolvable. Instead of taking the easy way out, we should look at our goals. Instead of publishing information easily overtaken by events, we should look towards improving our ability to receive, update, and disseminate civil affairs information by establishing an active network or database that units can access. This network could be as complicated as a computerized civil affairs database or as simple as a standard civil affairs update message that could be incorporated into existing area studies. The ideal solution would be something that could be included in the Intelligence Analysis System that is being fielded.

Unfortunately, some wounds are self-inflicted. Civil affairs' Reserve status caused some unique problems and led to some innovative solutions. On the active duty side, civil affairs is often assigned as an additional duty for some officer on the staff judge advocate's (SJA's) staff, if it's assigned at all. If the commanding officer wants to know how to get in touch with key government officials or wants to know about the availability of civilian labor or civilian transportation, will the SJA have the information, resources, and expertise? Civil affairs personnel should be advising the G-3/S-3 on the civil impact of proposed military operations, not working in the SJA's office. When tactically feasible, civil affairs teams should be the commanding officer's eyes and ears in the civilian community. In addition to gathering civil affairs-related information, the teams should be cross-trained so that they know the unit's intelligence reporting procedures. The survey, liaison, and reconnaissance party (SLRP), which would go in prior to an MPF-supplied force's arrival, provides a golden opportunity to get either civil affairs personnel or at least someone with civil affairs experience on the ground.

Given the bureaucracy, we must anticipate valuable time being lost before adequate civil affairs personnel are on the ground and ready to start their assessments. Activating, processing, and integrating teams into the supported units will take time. Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait, the 4th CAG effectively used drill weekends and



annual training duty funds to gather information. Given 4th CAG's Washington, DC, location and the civilian occupations of many of its Marines, it turned to a wide variety of academic and government agencies for information about Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. This homegrown method of obtaining badly needed information worked well but not without some problems. Since message traffic was received through Reserve not active duty channels, it was difficult to combine readily available information with the current intelligence available to the Corps. Furthermore, activation cut the CAGs off from their homegrown sources of information without ensuring that they were effectively integrated into the intelligence cycle. The G-2/S-2 shops barely had enough personnel and resources to keep up with their primary mission—the production of needed combat intelligence. The addition of civil affairs-generated essential elements of information would have overloaded the system. Granting civil affairs personnel access to the source material so the CAGs could perform their own analysis could have helped, but there was great reluctance to do so. One solution would be to add a wartime billet for a civil affairs intelligence officer to the G-2/S-2 for each MEU and MEF. If the surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence groups (SRIGs) stay around, a better option would be to create a civil affairs intelligence cell within the intelligence company's table of organization (T/O). Since the SRIG was formed to give the MEF commander the ability to task organize intelligence support for both the MEF and other MAGTFs, it is the most logical place and would provide the supported commander with

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the capability to produce civil affairs intelligence within the MAGTF.

### Host-Nation Relations

The area study needs to go into great detail about the nature and operation of the host government because one of civil affairs' missions is to minimize the impact of military operations on the population. This alone can go a long way towards maintaining good relations. The proper use of military/civilian liaison can ensure that small incidents remain small. In their respective areas of responsibility, Marines from the commanding general on down should be holding formal and informal meetings to coordinate with appropriate local officials.

**During DESERT SHIELD, the assignment of liaison personnel to the Al Jubayl police station provided a good example of working-level coordination. Marine liaison personnel assisted in investigating accidents involving both Marines and civilians. They also assisted by looking into a variety of civilian complaints against Marines.**

The area study becomes important because you can't meet one's civilian counterpart unless you know who he or she is. It also helps to have a general understanding of how their political system operates. Coordination is important at the working level because, as in any bureaucracy, the person holding the impressive title or office is not always the person who gets things done.

During DESERT SHIELD, the assignment of liaison personnel to the Al Jubayl police station provided a good example of working-level coordination. Marine liaison personnel assisted in investigating accidents involving both Marines and civilians. They also assisted by looking into a variety of civilian complaints against Marines. They often prevented minor incidents from getting out of hand and provided the command a "heads-up" if a major incident developed.

Since liaison personnel represent the Corps, a variety of factors must be considered when selecting individuals to fill these billets. Police liaison personnel should have military or civilian police experience. Other times, assignments will be dictated by the culture. Unless covered in the area study, this is less obvious. For example, assigning women to liaison duties in Saudi Arabia probably would not have been very effective. Since the Saudis place great emphasis on rank and title in their social and business dealings, higher ranking officers should be assigned to liaison duties.

### Resource Procurement: Civil Affairs' Other Face

Another civil affairs mission is to assist the supported command by using local resources to minimize the burden on military resources and to ensure that such resources are obtained in accordance with the Law of Land Warfare. By taking everything in Kuwait that was not bolted

down, the Iraqis obtained additional resources, but in doing so they violated international standards of conduct and further alienated the people.

Using local resources frees up equipment and personnel, supplements supply stocks, and speeds up the supply cycle. It can also improve local relations by creating additional business. Once again, we come back to the area study and why potential resources and key businesses need to be identified. While finding necessary resources may be easy, cultural differences and different business practices may make negotiations difficult. Contracting officers from the force service support group (FSSG) can easily offend local businessmen unless they understand business practices. Information on such practices should be addressed in the area study.

After the air war began on 17 January 1991, many of the third-country nationals who were contracted to drive trucks or work at the various Marine Corps facilities near Al Jubayl stopped showing up for work. This came as an unwelcome surprise. While the loss of some base workers was inconvenient, the loss of the drivers threatened the overall mission and caused Marines to be pulled from other assignments. What caused the "strike"?

Why did it come as such a surprise?

Hearing about the Iraqis' chemical weapons, base workers became concerned because Marines had gas masks and they didn't. It should not have been surprising that these contracted civilians did not want to drive under what they perceived to be hazardous conditions. Many of the workers came from Senegal, Pakistan, and Egypt and may not have felt that they had a whole lot riding on the success or failure of the coalition forces. Though many returned to work after receiving bonus pay or gas masks, a better assessment of their attitudes may have prevented the strike in the first place. Similar problems arising from cultural differences and cultural misunderstandings are often encountered by businessmen and government officials working overseas.

Many cultures, especially in Africa and the Mideast, do not separate business dealings from social dealings. Small talk and haggling over price are often expected for even a small purchase. Viewing business deals as an impersonal one-time transaction, Americans often come across as impatient and rude. During Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the common interest in defeating the Iraqis helped overcome these minor differences. However, in a LIC operation the population might have mixed loyalties, and then good business sense becomes even more important.

### Operational Support

Although it is important that MPF forces receive necessary civil affairs support while establishing themselves at their respective ports and airfields, the primary civil affairs mission is to provide operational support. The wide variety of possible missions that MAGTFs could be called on to per-

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form translates into an equally wide variety of possible civil-affairs-intensive missions—NEOs, show-of-force, combat, and relief operations to name a few. Marines, with or without civil affairs training or experience, may find themselves coordinating with local government officials, local businessmen, local residents, the U.S. Ambassador, and various international relief organizations, such as the Red Cross, CARE, etc. Operations may involve the establishment and running of civilian collection points, refugee camps, or food distribution centers.

During 1991, many units participated in civil affairs operations whether or not they were aware of it. SHARP EDGE (Liberia NEO), PROVIDE COMFORT (Kurdish relief), SEA ANGEL (Bangladesh Cyclone relief), and FIERY VIGIL (Philippine volcano relief) were all civil affairs intensive operations and provided the units involved with real world civil affairs experience. (For more on these operations, see *MCG*, Nov91). The hectic operational pace of 1991 carried over into 1992, which culminated in the 15th MEU landing in Mogadishu, Somalia. Operation RESTORE HOPE demonstrated how much the Marine Corps has really come into its own. The Marines successfully accomplished a mission that some pundits thought they would be too "immature" or "quick on the trigger" to accomplish. It was a complex mission that required the Marines to establish a strong military presence in order to perform essentially a humanitarian relief mission. Strength and restraint were needed at all levels—from the fire team to the joint task force. This delicate balancing act worked because it required two capabilities found in just about every Marine: basic warfighting skills and common sense.

Prior to 1990, recent civil affairs experience of the Marine Corps was limited to Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and various relief operations such as the earthquake in the Philippines. DESERT SHIELD/STORM and the other operations have created a vast reservoir of experience. In addition to receiving relevant civil affairs experience, the CAGs were afforded the opportunity to integrate into the regular forces in support of MPF and combat operations. In addition, the NEO and relief operations the Marine Corps participated in during 1991 validated the civil affairs-related training received as part of the MEU(SOC) training evolution. The combination of events and operations improved the perception of Marine civil affairs both inside and outside of the Marine Corps.

### Outlook

While finally establishing a civil affairs doctrine for the Marine Corps is important, it is equally important that we keep exchanging ideas. By looking at what worked and fixing what didn't, Marine Corps civil affairs has matured, and by studying recent operations we can become even better. Civil affairs must be considered an integral part of any operation and not as a separate disci-

pline. Like intelligence or logistics, civil affairs must work in conjunction with operations. The impact of the civilian population on proposed courses of action and the impact of the proposed courses of action on the civilian population should be evaluated routinely during the staff planning process.

Operational failure may extract a very high price. While it may seem cynical, a successful relief operation like SEA ANGEL improves the image of Marines not only in the eyes of those helped, but also in the eyes of those at home as press coverage shows Marines performing humanitarian acts. This is especially important during this time of shrinking budgets and economic uncertainty, when taxpayers and their representatives in Congress may ask, "Do we still need the Marines?"

The flexibility that the Marine Corps has shown in meeting the new mission of the 1990s and the next century is probably one of the key reasons that the Marine Corps made it through the most recent budget battle less bloodied than the other Services. Although 174,000 active duty Marines fall short of the 177,000 the Marine Corps needs to meet current operational commitments, it is certainly an improvement over some of the other proposals that would have reduced the Corps to as low as 159,000.

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