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BUSH BRIGADES

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AMONG the progressive and altruistic members of the Community of Nations Uncle Sam undoubtedly stands preëminent in every "New Movement"; whether it be national or international, he is always to be found distinctly at the front. "Clean Up" weeks are his specialty and he will "clean up" anything or any place—a disease or a nation.

Now this work of creating order out of chaos and showing small nations the way they should go is justly considered to be accomplished to the satisfaction of everybody if it were not for the peculiar attitude of the American people themselves. As it is, just about the time that all is going well—when the ex-generals are busily engaged in weaving wonderful straw hats in the local *fortalezas,* and the farmers are planting the largest crop acreage in the history of the country and the kids are all going to school, and the national lottery is being run on the square, and the anxious expression has faded from the faces of everybody in general, somebody rises up and yells in print: Marines are down in Jungleland!—and killed a man in a war!—and we didn't know anything about it! Presto! and the people mill around like liaison officers in a World War and inaugurate such a campaign of investigation, castigation * and restoration that the "Hired Hessians" are forced to do the job over again—or yet.

In so far as the Marines in general are concerned, they believe that in every case where the United States has taken charge of a small state it has been actuated by purely altruistic motives. The layman doubtless thinks that the troops themselves give little thought to this phase, but then he does not realize that upon this very thing the fighting morale of the individual is founded and

*Fourth Brigade Marine: Hey, Bill! Wot's a Specification?

First Brigade Marine: Oh, nothin'! Just a Citation with the date and place changed.

that it forms the basis for the conduct of all military operations. It must be remembered also that the Marine is on the spot and sees from day to day the good that is actually being accomplished. That alone is amply sufficient to decide the ethics of the question so far as he is concerned.

The particular motives for the interference in another nation's affairs are many and varied. The action may be taken for the protection of lives and property of our own or foreign citizens, the establishment of a stable government in order that international obligations may be respected, the general disciplining and education of a state for its debut into the society of nations, or for any other ethical reason with the Monroe Doctrine as a background. And in this connection it may be noted that, in the eyes of many people, this background is so subordinated to figure interest that it is entirely obscured.

But whatever the particular motive may be, in any case it is generally clearly outlined in the Proclamation of Occupation, thus giving the cue for conduct to the forces of occupation and the natives alike. It is incumbent upon them to get along together; and they always do get along quite well provided they are not interfered with by outside forces.

The economic conditions in most of the small nations with whom we are concerned have many of the same characteristics. The mass of the people gain their existence from the soil, and therefore have the usual passionate fondness of the land. But coupled with this there is always a lack of proper land registry and cadastral surveys. This situation results in great and constant friction and unrest. Then there is the question of production areas and markets. The terrain of the normal small nation is thick and mountainous, and there is a paucity of communications. A producer in a production area may be unable to market products on account of the latter or his only available market may lie within another small nation inimical to his own. Above all, he is the victim of market manipulation.

The application of military force upon people of the nature portrayed will now be considered. There have been but very few cases where the use of armed force has not been necessary to some extent at least. As a rule, the following enemy operations are met with:

(*a*) A somewhat disorganized attempt to prevent landings.

(*b*) More or less resistance in cities followed by a race to the jungle.

(*c*) The organization and operation of armed bands, at first risking open battle and finally waging guerilla warfare.

(*d*) The operation of outlaw bands (bandits, ladrones, cacos) who rob and murder members of the forces of occupation and their own people indiscriminately.

In general, enemy operations will be those of irregular forces or guerilla bands with the usual series of surprise raids, ambushes and assassinations. The enemy will have moral support from most of his own people, material support from many, and will operate in their midst.

If a force controls the fertile areas and markets (plus intercommunications) of a country it controls practically all, for within those areas are contained the mass of foreign and native population and their property.

The small nations are comparatively restricted in area and are physically very similar. The nation physically consists of a high and difficult mountain mass skirted by volcanic foothills trimmed with coral platform insertion. All is overlaid by a dense mantle of trees and jungle except the limited cultivated areas and prairies (savannas, llanos, pampas), which are usually covered with rank crops of grass. Land communications are few and poor and the sea forms the main highway. The terminal for any fertile area is generally the outlet of the valley—the nearest seaport.

We thus have the strategy:

(*a*) Land simultaneously and take over the important seaports to secure the doors of the country.

(*b*) Establish a line of fortified posts in the interior to cover production areas, steady the wavering and faint-hearted population and serve as bases for supply and rest for the operation of mobile troops.

(*c*) Drive with flying columns into the isolated districts and mop up.

In carrying out all or any one of the various strategic phases the action should be in the form of a surprise, and once begun should be prosecuted uninterruptedly to a final conclusion. Slowness of action will be considered as weakness and leniency as

timidity, and the practice of either will only result in the prolongation of hostilities and consequent suffering to all concerned.

Landing and mopping up a seaport is not a difficult matter provided the job is treated as a military operation. But the landing of a force at a customs wharf, or similar front-door entrance, may be very difficult for the reason that the disposition of troops is such as to encourage an enemy to strike, and if he strikes the troops are poorly disposed to return the compliment. There is no known reason why this condition should ever obtain. When a Marine force lands in whatever fashion the enemy knows that it will not fight unless attacked, and also knows that if the landing force is attacked it will fight back and complete the job. Some may object to this on the grounds that the orders are to seize a limited objective—the customs house, or some other particular facility in the city—and that a "peaceful landing" is to be made. While that may be the fact, there is no known reason why the landing force should not be disposed to control the city pending the successful accomplishment of the particular mission. Experience demonstrates that there is a good chance that the particular mission will not be accomplished peaceably.

A proper procedure would be to land suddenly at one or more points in the vicinity of the port, encircle the city (seizing any commanding ground for the mopping-up force), and jump off. The encircling (or control) of the city is very important for several reasons; port facilities are secured, the hostiles that are caught in the cities will not have to be chased in the bush afterward, the mopping-up force will have choice of jumping-off positions and directions of advance. The ideal conditions would be those permitting the mopping-up force to jump off from an elevated position and advance in the direction of the sea. Such conditions would ensure the widest use of the land and sea forces available, lessen the danger of interfiring among one's own troops, and bring the most complete results. Moreover, if the occupation of a city is carried out as a real military operation the danger of bloodshed will be lessened for the reason that the rapid unfolding of the various stages of action will tend to render resistance manifestly hopeless.

The efficient and economical success of the mopping-up force properly landed, will depend, like any other operation, upon the completeness of the staff work, battle formations used, weapons

available and coördination. Sectors and street objectives should be assigned, directions of advance prescribed for each sector, and plans made for coördinating progress.

The opposition to be met with will vary greatly. While the usual city will be capable of a very strong resistance on account of the prevalent type of architecture and street plan, yet it is not likely that the hostile element will be so organized or the spirit of resistance will be so widespread as to cause universal resistance throughout. The resistance will most likely be centred on those sections inhabited or frequented by the younger and more lawless elements and native troops, such as the Red Light district and the plaza district, with its so-called palace, police and troop barracks and club buildings. On the other hand, peoples of all nations are rapidly gaining knowledge of the military art and wholesale resistance, with organized city outskirts and block-by-block fighting, may be met with and should be prepared for.

The type of battle formation best suited to normal conditions is believed to be lines of combat groups as follows:

First Line.—One group for each street, composed of one or more squads of infantry (normal equipment with special supply of grenades), two or more special liaison agents with signal equipment (lanterns or flags and pyrotechnics), and two or more pioneers with demolition and scaling equipment (grapnels with line, rope ladders, axes, etc.).

Second Line.—Organized, equipped and disposed in the same manner as the first line with the addition of one machine gun, one 37-mm. or one Stokes mortar (or all) to each group. It is the mission of this line to generally support the first line, and, particularly by the fire of 37-mm., Stokes mortar, machine guns and automatic rifles, advantageously placed in commanding buildings, "grease" the advance of the first line. This line should be in readiness to join the first when a house-to-house resistance is encountered.

Third Line.—Organized, equipped and disposed in the same manner as the second line with the addition of infantry details necessary for patrolling the occupied sections. The functions of this line will be to generally support the advanced lines, be in readiness to replace the second line in case it is merged into the first line, and to provide for the security of the sections occupied.

The second and third lines should normally advance street

objective distance in rear of the line next in advance and be in readiness to leap frog as ordered. Tanks or armored cars, if available, should be placed in the first line. They are particularly effective in debouching on cross streets or plazas or advancing on specially organized buildings.

The use of artillery in street fighting against a small nation enemy should be carefully considered. As before stated, the resistance will not be universal, as a rule, but only that of the worst elements. Unless this resistance is confined to more or less isolated sections artillery fire should be used with extreme care on account of endangering the lives of helpless innocents. Its functions in many cases can be fulfilled by special infantry weapons and machine guns. The infantryman being on the spot sees the major part of the resistance in human form and destroys only what he sees. The artilleryman, on board ship or on shore, sees only the area of resistance and destroys that plus almost anything else in the vicinity. The foregoing is not to be construed to the effect that the infantry is not extremely thankful for all the artillery support it can get at any time—only that under certain conditions it might not be strictly humane.

It is worthy of note that a few years ago it was the custom to bombard towns with ships' guns when mopping up and at the same time the use of grenades was forbidden to the infantry on the ground that their use was inhumane. This situation has since been half-way reversed—grenades are issued.

Immediately upon the occupation of the seaports the next important step is the projection of mobile columns into the interior to pursue and destroy any irregular forces that may be in existence, cover production areas, and establish fortified posts—advanced bases for further operations.

The strength and composition of these columns will, of course, depend upon the probable resistance to be encountered, the terrain to be traversed, and the type and condition of existing communications. Normally, besides infantry with its special weapons, the addition of mounted detachments, armored cars and aircraft is desirable. Light field guns would rarely be necessary if the infantry be provided with 37-mm. guns or Stokes mortars. No weapons which would tend to decrease mobility and which are not absolutely needed should be included.

The land transportation carried on Marine transports is always

limited, and most of that necessary for the supply of mobile columns must be seized at the seaports. Due provision must be made for effecting this when the seaports are occupied. Of course, the transport seized in a country is adapted to the country—whatever the type. And in some cases the roads will permit of truck transport—a limited amount of which is always carried with expeditionary forces. A truck convoy with automatic rifle and grenade defense and an armored car escort is ideal if roads permit. If bull cart or pack transport is used mounted troops should be provided as escorts.

An excellent example of the organization and operation of a mobile column of the nature herein considered was the Pendleton Column which drove from Monte Cristi to Santiago in 1916. The affair was correctly conceived, thoroughly planned, and well carried out; and signally demonstrated the possibilities of a limited number of troops with nondescript native transport operating in difficult country.

As soon as the mobile columns have destroyed or dispersed any irregular forces in the production areas the next step in order is the establishment of fortified posts for the prosecution of the last strategical phase—the drives of flying columns into the far interior.

The particular functions of a fortified post are as follows:

(*a*) To cover production areas and communication with markets.

(*b*) To observe and steady the populace.

(*c*) To form a base of supply, rest, replacement, and information for flying columns.

As a general rule, these posts will be located at valley heads on main roads or water-ways leading from sea bases and at the apices of valley and inter-valley roads and trails leading to the more difficult jungle and mountain regions—the final theatre of operations.

The site of the post should have, if possible, the following characteristics:

(*a*) Be capable of defense by a small detachment.

(*b*) Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of a flying column of one hundred men, with mounted detachment.

(*c*) Permit of control of any town in vicinity and of all approaches, especially roads and ravines.

(*d*) Have sufficient elevation to generally observe the surrounding country.

(*e*) Have direct access to water supply and main road.

(*f*) Permit of control of landing field for aeroplanes.

In many cases old forts, redoubts, or isolated masonry buildings with compounds can be organized and are suitable for the purpose. Often, however, it will be found that conditions warrant the construction of an entirely new post from the material available in vicinity.

The main requirement of a fortified post, garrisoned, as it will be, by only a few men, is that it cannot be rushed. This requirement can be met by constructing a double defense of the palisade type; an outer defense (occupied only when flying column is present) to enclose the bivouac area and an inner defense, or keep, to enclose the depôt facilities and permanent garrison, provision being made in both lines for the widest use of automatic weapons and grenades. The outer defense forms the obstacle for the inner defense and all portions of it should be within bombing range. Such earthworks as the armament of the enemy may render necessary should be provided in addition.

Communications with fortified posts, especially in the beginning, will be largely by air patrol, and a most complete liaison plan must be perfected. A landing field may not be available, and in any case unnecessary landings on natural fields are to be avoided.

With fortified posts established the flying column phase of the operations begin. This is the most arduous—although the most interesting—of all phases; the idea being to beat the native guerilla at his own game on his own ground.

The enemy will operate in his own territory, among his own people, and every habitation will be a base of supply. In other words, he will be most familiar with the terrain, have the best channels of information, and will be free of all impedimenta. He will be the survivor of the worst of the irregular forces and will know no rule of war—he will assassinate, ambush and disperse, and repeat it until destroyed.

To operate with rapid success against such an enemy requires a very high standard of both individual and organization training in bush warfare combined with good natural individual mental alertness and physical endurance.

At the beginning of the flying column operations the columns may be of considerable strength—say a company of infantry

with a mounted detachment. As the enemy is finally worn down, combat patrols (mounted or unmounted) consisting of one or more squads may suffice. The mission of the flying column will be to find the enemy and then fight fast and hard and pursue him to the limit. Therefore, there should be nothing in its composition or armament tending to reduce its mobility or independence of action beyond that absolutely necessary. Except for supplies which can be carried by the men the column must, as a rule, depend upon the fortified posts. These posts must be established in sufficient numbers to permit of this—a post always being within a day or two's march.

And while on the subject of the supply and mobility of flying columns it must be emphatically stated that a flying column should never be sent into the bush unless amply provided with CASH. With it can be purchased knowledge of the terrain and movements of the enemy, and food. It is safe to say that at least 50 per cent. of the so-called harsh measures used in bush warfare could be eliminated by providing the troops with adequate information money. (As a rule, however, the intelligence fund that is available is paid out in salaries to so-called secret agents for reporting the incoherent babblings of harmless native politicians in barrooms.)

The conditions under which flying columns or groups operate, as set forth, naturally force the adoption of a formation of the mobile square type. This may be described as a formation organized so as to be able to immediately and automatically exert fighting power in any direction. For instance, a company of infantry is marching through thick jungle and is ambushed from the front and both flanks; an advanced group exerts rifle, automatic rifle, and grenade fire to the front and both flanks and advances. A second group marching only a short distance in rear, projects itself into the bush on the right and rolls up the enemy flank; a third group marching directly in rear of the second group, operates similarly on the left; a fourth (rear) group marching a short distance in rear of the two flank groups, protects the rear and advances with the attack.

Having completed, in brief, an account of the fighting to be expected in effecting a "peaceful occupation," it will be well to touch upon a few of the special circumstances which attend a war that is not a war.

To enforce one's will upon an enemy of the nature depicted without subjecting one's self to undue criticism is one of the most difficult tasks that can confront a soldier. The "Rules of Land Warfare" lay down certain rules which are to be followed, subject to military necessity during hostilities between regular forces of civilized nations. The "Rules of Land Warfare" for the guidance of a regular force engaged in hostilities with irregular or guerilla forces have never been written; and it is doubtful if they will ever be written because people only write about such operations when they are accomplished facts.

There is a certain amount of brutality in any kind of warfare that can never be eliminated. As published rules for conduct become more strict, action under military necessity increases. When one is confronted by a type of warfare not contemplated by the framers of published rules the only sound guide to action is a thorough knowledge of the end in view of the United States, coupled with a knowledge of the methods used by other civilized nations under similar conditions.

Other civilized nations, when confronted by irregular or guerilla warfare, have taken the following measures among others:

(*a*) Killed or wounded the individuals concerned and destroyed their property.

(*b*) Destroyed the property of people who aided or abetted the enemy.

(*c*) Laid waste entire sections inhabited by people generally supporting the enemy.

(*d*) Removed and dispersed women and children living in an area of unrest.

All of the above-named measures with the exception of the first have the great disadvantage in that their application is likely to exasperate the people as a whole and tend to forfeit their friendship permanently. (Mothers in these countries particularly are prone to nurse hatred and pass it along to their children.) That the friendship of the people of any occupied nation should be forfeited by the adoption of any unnecessarily harsh measures is avowedly contrary to the policy of the United States. It would seem, therefore, that the proper method would be to kill or wound the individuals actually in arms, or at least, hunt them from their homes and destroy any property which they may have.

If the families of bandits and those of an actively supporting element suffer by this procedure it is unfortunate but amply justified. In case these measures fail and harsher measures are necessary to clear up a situation, then it is the duty of the seniors (experienced officers) to determine what shall be done after a careful estimate of the factors involved. Each situation should be treated as a separate problem and the most humane solution, always keeping in mind the safety of our own troops, should be applied.

While the foregoing line of conduct seems to suffice for the solution of any case, yet it does not always for various reasons.

When Uncle Sam occupies the territory of a small nation he wants to enforce his will but he does not want any trouble—that is, any stir that may cause undue comment among his own people or among foreign governments. He wants to interfere as little as possible with the lives of the people—in fact, he wants to be considered the good angel (that he really is) by the nation that he is cleaning up, and this policy "Clean Up Without Trouble" is transmitted down to the junior who is actually cleaning up the "corners."

The military operations under the enforced conditions are generally recognized as ethical and proper as long as there is some semblance of military organization in the hostile element; it is considered as ordinary, legitimate fighting. It is the final phase which is difficult because, owing to the policy pursued, the following conditions will prevail to a greater or lesser extent:

(*a*) Bands of murderers and other criminals base in thick, difficult country and prey indiscriminately on the peaceful people in the production areas.

(*b*) These bandits have no property other than that which they carry with them or keep in hiding.

(*c*) None of these bandits, whatever their crimes, have ever been executed after having been captured and turned over to proper authority.

(*d*) Many bandits, having been captured and turned over to proper authority, have been permitted to escape and have rejoined their bands.

(*e*) The inhabitants of localities frequented by bandits keep them informed of the movement of the force of occupation.

(*f*) The forces of occupation are at a minimum—not more

than 1 to every 100 native males capable of bearing arms and not more than 1 to each 5 square miles of territory.

(*g*) Combat columns have little cash to use.

Immediately upon the occupation of any portion of foreign territory the peculiar problems of small-nation occupation present themselves for solution. The operations staff section, heretofore occupied with using military means for the purpose of fighting, faces about and bends its efforts toward using them for the purpose of avoiding fighting. The methods employed to effect this determine the organization, strength, and distribution of the forces of occupation.

As has been stated before, in most small nations the chief danger to a peaceful occupation is the effect of hostile propaganda initiated and spread by the agitator class (aided by the activity of the lawless element) on the producer class, especially during economic crises. In fact, there can be no serious uprisings unless the producer class joins in the movement.

The problem thus resolves itself into a question of keeping informed of the revolutionary propaganda of the agitator class, together with the movements of the lawless elements, and the economic conditions surrounding the producer class; and acting with the means at hand to forestall evil effects.

The forces of occupation have four weapons with which to act: (*a*) Intelligence Service; (*b*) Provost Service (including exceptional Military Courts); (*c*) moral effect of the presence of troops; and finally (*d*) fighting action.

It is well to consider the first two weapons very closely in connection with "peaceful occupation," for it is mainly by their efficient action that such things are accomplished.

The intelligence and provost services belong to that class of services which may be indifferently provided for with impunity so long as brave men are available and ready for expenditure. Hence the scant attention given to them in the preparation of operation plans, tables of organization, school curriculums, and similar preparatory measures. As a rule, they are established only when the necessities of operations force it upon higher command.

Correctly speaking, the functions of intelligence in a bush brigade should include the gathering and dissemination of all information necessary for ensuring correct action—political and

military—on the part of the military government. This information includes (*a*) a thorough analysis of the psychology of the people (including their origin, history, temperament, civilization, etc.), economic conditions and their tendencies, the various political factions, and, in fact, all fundamental forces which may act to affect the tranquillity of the country during the twilight sleep of occupation; (*b*) current information regarding the action of fundamental forces; (*c*) predictions as to the future action of those forces, and (*d*) up-to-date information of a purely military character, including potential and active military strength and morale, terrain data, etc.

It may be said that this is a big task and requires a large and efficient organization. It is—and does. At present it requires a section of Naval Intelligence, a section of Marine Corps Operations and a normal bush brigade intelligence unit—all, at least until the fundamental work is completed.

The normal organization required is approximately as follows:

(*a*) OFFICE:

(*1*) *Correspondence Section:*

Research work—collation of information—dissemination of information by daily, monthly and special reports.

(*2*) *Information File Section:*

Analysis of fundamental forces.

Personal cards and cases on leaders of political, revolutionary, and criminal elements.

Cases on "anti-" movements.

Military information.

(*3*) *Mapping Section:*

Preparation and distribution of maps and charts—military, political, economic, physical, meteorological, etc.

(*b*) FIELD:

(1) Troops—minor intelligence organizations.

(2) Agents—press—personal channels.

There are two main peculiarities to be found among the people of ordinary small nations which form the basis for current intelligence activity: (*a*) Political parties do not represent principles but the personal ideas of influential leaders of the political

agitator class who may change their minds overnight; (*h*) hostile military action of any moment depends upon the success of a political faction in swaying (by threat or promise) the producer class. Hence current intelligence actually resolves itself into a close observation of the movements of the influential political agitators and the economic conditions attendant to the producer class and sounding timely warning of their consequences. If a particular insidious hostile movement is inaugurated by the agitator class during an economic crisis trouble may be expected. As a rule, a serious condition of this nature cannot be successfully combated by counter-propaganda unless conducted on a prohibitive scale. At least provost action against the leaders combined with increased activity of troops will be necessary to insure tranquillity. The ordinary political agitator knows no limit except that set by force. The ordinary producer believes anything he hears, but what he sees is decisive. The sight of one clean-cut, armed Marine will offset volumes of hostile propaganda.

In executing the intelligence functions as stated the most difficult problem of all is to force the intelligence personnel to realize that its mission is not to gather information of any kind and place it on file, as is generally the custom, but to gather pertinent information, put it in proper form for use and then place it in the hands of the person who can use it to best advantage—and this as quickly as possible.

The provost service, including the exceptional military court system, represents the military government to the mass of the people, with whom it comes in direct contact, and is the normal active instrument for the enforcement of tranquillity. During the irksome months or years of reconstruction, when there must be effected a continual and vital change in native methods of life in all its respects, the provost service stands watch over all. It, more than any other element of the forces, should understand the people—temperament, customs, activities, and the every-day working of the every-day native mind. Its functions warrant a well-founded and complete organization—including provost marshals and judges with legal knowledge, good and loyal interpreters and sufficient clerical assistance to dispatch business with justice and celerity.

The most peculiar (and the worst) characteristic of the usual provost service (a part of the judicial system of the occupied

territory) is that it is required to maintain itself by the punishments which it inflicts. This, too, notwithstanding the fact that the more efficient the service becomes the less liability there is of orders being violated—and thus a decrease in funds available for its maintenance at standard. As a rule, however, when lack of funds threatens the disruption of the organization in any locality the officer directly concerned keeps the "buck" and uses his initiative.

The moral value of the presence of troops and fighting power to preserve tranquillity need scarcely be commented upon.

A small nation should be occupied in sufficient strength to always keep the fact of military supervision before the eyes of the people. The forces necessary to effect this may be termed the permanent occupation force. This force, widely distributed among a number of permanent posts, by its patrol activity, makes visible the fact of occupation to the people, steadies them, and insures a thorough policing of the land. These centres of troop activity coincide closely with the production areas and their markets.

In addition to the permanent occupation forces there should be mobile reserves so located that they may be quickly poured into temporarily disaffected areas, and by a demonstration of strength show the impracticability of armed resistance.

Fighting action is the last resort and constant effort must be exerted to build up and maintain a fighting edge among troops that will render their use instantaneous and decisive. The practice of "letting down" on things military as soon as general tranquillity is restored is bad in that it leads the people to underestimate the power of the troops (thus encouraging agitation) and gives the troops a false idea of their functions besides lessening that efficiency in general. Mobile reserve centres should be the training centres for the various areas. This arrangement not only makes for economy in men and material but, if a proper and constant interchange of organizations is maintained within the areas, keeps the fighting efficiency and moral fibre of all troops at a high standard.

Yes, the Marines are down in jungleland, and they did kill a man in a war, and a great many people did not know anything about it. This is most unfortunate, but—the Marines are only doing their job as ordered by the people of the United States.